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Abstract: Despite his connection to daily life in East Germany; east Germans began 
replacing their chubby, hat-wearing pedestrian light figure (the Ost-Ampelmännchen, or 
Ampelmann) with the non-descript West German one in the euphoria of reunification. By 
the mid-1990s, however, east Germans began to see their old state differently, bringing 
back their Ampelmann as a reminder of the safety, security, and equality their old state 
possessed. Following his resurrection, Ampelmann transformed into a pop-culture icon as 
shops sprung up selling Ampelmann-branded products. From here, his popularity spread 
as Ampelmann lights appeared in western Germany and Ampelmann shops opened their 
doors not only in Berlin, but also in Tokyo and Seoul. East Germans supported this, 
declaring that his popularity showed that their past and its values could find a place in a 
globalizing world. In doing so, East Germans have used and rewritten their past to 








      Traffic lights were probably the last thing on the minds of East Germans on 9 
November 1989 as the Berlin Wall fell and the borders of their German Democratic 
Republic (GDR) opened. The dissolution of the socialist state quickly followed as 
Germans on both sides tossed the GDR’s cars, furniture, government, ideals, and even its 
traffic lights into the rubbish heap in favour of the more “progressive”, “modern”, and 
“better” products and systems of West Germany.
1
 A negative view of East Germany 
emerged from this process which focused on the terror and repression of the ruling 
Socialist Unity Party (SED) and the Ministry for State Security (MfS or Stasi).
2
 Most 
easterners and westerners adopted this stance, agreeing that the former East German state 
had few, if any, redeeming features.
3
 This process led to a demonization of the GDR. 
Scholars on both sides of the former Wall began condemning the horrendous actions of 
the GDR, positing that this aberrant “second dictatorship”, a sequel to National 
Socialism, had continued along Germany’s “Special Path” while its western cousin 
developed “normally” according to liberal democratic principles.
4
 
      East Germans were thrilled, at first, with their inclusion in this glorious West, 
welcoming the treasures of Western consumer culture, embracing both unrestricted travel 
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and freedom from state repression.
5
 East Germans’ situation, particularly in comparison 
to those from other former Eastern Bloc countries, “seemed much clearer and the future 
much brighter; instant inclusion into a well-functioning West German democracy and an 
affluent and socially regulated market economy…”
6
 In short order, however, the rosy 
haze of reunification lifted, revealing a west which was neither as accepting nor as 
wonderful as easterners had first imagined.  
      Globally hegemonic neoliberal capitalism was responsible for part of this 
disenchantment. Neoliberalism, which began its global ascent in the late 1970s, is a 
“theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be 
advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an 
institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets and 
free trade.”
7
 The neoliberal order brought rapid capitalist expansion through the 
eradication of trade barriers, the opening up of markets, and the global restructuring of 
the means of production. Simultaneously, the planet hastily shrank as information 
technologies and increasing economic interdependence drew citizens of the world ever 
more closely together.
89
 These values had already taken hold in West Germany by 1983 
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when the conservative Free Democratic Party (FDP) and Christian Democratic Union 
(CDU/CSU) coalition took power, repealing the more Keynesian policies of the 1960s 
and 70s.
10
 Although the strength of trade unions and social protection meant that West 
Germany never fully adopted neoliberal values, in the eyes of East Germans, the state 
into which they merged still appeared frightening, uncaring, hostile, and destructive.
11
 
      The inequalities inherent in this system, which conflicted with the socialist heritage of 
east Germans, resulted in melancholy: “Life turbulences and upheavals in life trajectories 
were experienced by a vast majority of East Germans in the area of employment and 
work…in comparison with 1989, jobs declined by about one third during the next three 
years.”
12
 This unhappiness and uncertainty for the future, in contrast to the relative 
security of life in the GDR, was reflected in birth rates: “immediately after unification, 
the birth rate in the Eastern Länder [states] fell dramatically, reaching its lowest point in 
1994 at 79, 000 live births. This represented a fall of some 60 percent of the total births 
registered in 1989.”
13
 East German women, in particular, had a turbulent post-Wall 
experience as western values of domesticity were imposed both culturally and through 
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the removal of programmes such as state-funded child care, which had allowed East 
German women to enjoy employment nearly equal to that of men before 1989.
14
 
      West German media contributed to this turmoil by attempting to define what the GDR 
was, who east Germans were, and what this meant for the newly unified country. Western 
publications did this in the years directly following reunification by dismissing the GDR: 
“all of the important actors in the [western] media [spoke] negatively about numerous 
aspects of GDR life.”
15
 Others declared that east Germans were “psychologically 
deformed by dictatorship,” characterizing the general population as “high-ranking SED 
members and Stasi informers.”
16
 While such harsh criticisms have mostly receded, east 




      The government of contemporary Germany also attempted to define the East German 
state, focusing on “stories and images of suffering, repression, and state violence…” to 
form “the concept” which guides national sites of remembrance.
18
 Forming this 
“concept” effectively created an official national memory in which easterners appeared as 
“powerless victims of an all-pervasive ‘totalitarian system.’”
19
 The rapid availability of 
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documents from the GDR following reunification, in contrast to the 30-year hold placed 
on comparable Western documents, contributed to the dictatorship narrative as the 
horrors of the MfS were easily and immediately available to scholars and to the public.
20
 
While of undoubted significance to GDR history, exclusive focus on this image can also 
be “seen as part of a wider discursive strategy” in which the GDR “became a negative 
foil [against] which the democracy of contemporary Germany defines itself…” and which 
“…helps to affirm the achievements of the Federal Republic.”
21
 Enforcing the 
dictatorship paradigm also overlooks the West’s own failings, most notably western 
unwillingness to fully deal with the National Socialist legacy.
22
 
      Scholars, too, have focused on the totalitarian rule of the SED. “Indeed,” as Catherine 
Epstein points out, “perhaps the most salient feature of German work on GDR history is 
its extraordinary politicization.”
23
 The plethora of documents available following the 
state’s collapse has allowed scholars, primarily west Germans, but also east Germans and 
Anglophones to a lesser degree, to draw attention to the repressive methods of the state’s 
security apparatus.
24
 Comparing the resulting image of East Germany to the West, many 
scholars have addressed the GDR as Germany’s “second dictatorship.”
25
 This has 
allowed for the troubling rebirth of the discredited Sonderweg (special path) thesis which 
examines Germany’s departure from a “normal” path of development into the dangerous 
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paths of authoritarianism – whether fascist or socialist.
26
 Historian Manfred Wilke 
epitomized these beliefs when he asserted his fear that de-emphasizing political 
oppression “would weaken the potential of the GDR to serve as an example of the battle 
between democracy and dictatorship in Germany’s history in the 20th century.”
27
 
Similarly, Anselma Gallinat examined attempts by SED victims to pass on their stories, 
asserting that the public’s unwillingness to listen obstructed “the development of suitable 




      While the narrative of state repression and terror is critical to understanding the GDR 
and its legacy, there are many aspects of life in East Germany and of East German 
identity which an exclusive focus on the SED and MfS excludes. Wolfgang Engler 
summarized this limitation most succinctly: “What is achieved when one has discovered 
that the GDR was neither a citizen’s democracy nor a competitive society? This is 
already well known.”
29
 Social historians, scholars of memory, and east Germans more 
generally, while accepting the limitations of the dictatorship narrative, have worked to 
create a more well-rounded understanding of East Germany by exploring everyday life in 
the GDR. The insightful assertion by Mary Fulbrook that the social history of East 
Germany is not one with “the politics left out” but rather “the people put back in”
30
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provides a framework in which it is possible to include both the role of the state and its 
citizens in East German history. 
      Social historians of the GDR have been key in this process. In contrast to narratives 
focusing exclusively on the state, scholars such as Mary Fulbrook, Paul Betts, Elizabeth 
A. Ten Dyke and Judd Stitziel have inserted East Germans back into their own history, 
revealing how it was possible to live rich, ordinary lives under state socialism. In broad 
strokes, these authors have revealed the distinct nature of life in the GDR, particularly 
when compared to life in a western democracy. Participating in the state, for example, did 
not involve voting per se but rather “being involved in the micro-systems of power 
through which GDR society worked” (participants consisted of perhaps one sixth of the 
population) or by writing Eingaben, letters of complaint, to the state in order to suggest 
ways that products and other aspects of East German life could be improved.
31
 Fashion 
and consumer culture also operated along different rhythms with the latter revolving 
around cycles of hunting, gathering, and hoarding in order to deal with the limited and 
irregular stock of East German shops.
32
 Pleasures such as vacations, while often less 
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lavish than those that westerners could purchase, were also available to East Germans.
33
 
Social histories of East Germany show that East German lives were full, complex, and 
surprisingly ordinary, suggesting furthermore that the memory of the GDR ought not to 
be limited to narratives of repression and terror. 
      Working with the essential premise that East Germans actively participated in the 
GDR, newer scholarship on memory and the GDR operates largely outside of the 
dictatorship paradigm. These works can be categorized into two interconnected, 
frequently overlapping groups: personal or everyday memories; and Ostalgie.
34
 Such 
studies have allowed for a more complete understanding of life in the GDR and what this 
past means to east Germans in reunified Germany. 
      One of the most prominent trends amongst social historians of the GDR and 
historians of memory is the study of East German generations. Here, Mary Fulbrook and 
Rene Lehmann, among others, have assessed the relation between life experience in the 
GDR and the subsequent memory of the state, particularly the “remarkable yearning for 
the past” among “older generations.”
35
 While those born in the early GDR are “capable of 
commenting both positively and negatively on the GDR after 1989,” many east Germans 
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are united in their distaste for a narrative focusing solely on dictatorship.
 36
 Furthermore, 




      Scholars of Ostalgie also frequently refer to east German aversion for an exclusive 
focus on the dictatorship narrative. Where scholars of GDR memory and nostalgia 
diverge, however, is in their focus on the remnants of GDR consumer and material 
culture in the Berlin Republic and the narratives of the past which these represent. 
Ostalgie, which elevates aspects of East German material culture to iconic status, arose 
out of the collision between eastern dissatisfaction, the cultural hegemony of the west, 
and the discrediting of the GDR past.
38
 “The difference between say, a West German 
Mercedes and an East German Trabant,” Paul Betts has argued, “has not been construed 
simply as alternative automobile styling but seized upon as the very expression of each 
country’s historical destiny.”
39
 By assigning importance to otherwise “valueless” objects, 
Ostalgie has emerged as a means through which an eastern identity can be reclaimed and 
the GDR past inscribed with meaning and value which simple comparisons between the 
West and East German states fail to do. 
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      The iterations of Ostalgie are many and varied, ranging from Eastern grocery 
products to cars, television programs, movies, websites, and even sex.
40
 The resurrection 
of the most popular car in the GDR, the Trabant, or Trabi, is one of the most well-known 
illustrations of this phenomenon. Its two-stroke engine, notorious fragility, smelly oil-gas 
fuel mixture and the difficulty of acquiring one made it an object of both cherished 
freedom and frustration in the GDR.
41
 After the fall of the Wall, the Trabi became a 
symbol of Eastern antiquation, particularly when compared with the better-built West 
German alternatives.
42
 As time went on and disenchantment with the west set in, 
however, east Germans began to once again embrace their endearingly unreliable 
automobiles, turning them into luxury cars and holding Trabi rallies, transforming the car 
into a symbol of the vanished GDR and the acceptance for which easterners longed.
43
  
      Although a broad discussion of Ostalgie is outside the scope of this study, a few main 
concepts central to this field will help to shape the interpretive frame of this work. 
Dominik Bartmanski, for example, redefined Ostalgie when he posited that: 
“…‘nostalgic’ icons are successful because they play the cultural role of mnemonic 
                                                 
40
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bridges to rather than tokens of longing for the failed communist past.”
44
 As we will see, 
the concept of a memory-bridge is particularly relevant to the examination of the 
transposition of GDR era ideals into the present. Bartmanski further developed the idea of 
subversion through comparison, arguing that “post-communism is revealed to be not just 
an anomic phase of early capitalism, but a cultural ‘site in which non-capitalist legacies 
transform the allegedly homogenizing tendencies of globalization’ and thus partake in 
‘remaking modernity.’”
45
 Paul Cooke has shown how Ostalgie functions similarly in 
attempting to “remake” German identity: 
…easterners do not wish to change the system of unified Germany, but to be able to 
remember their GDR past within it without restriction, which would enable their 
sense of east Germanness to sit more comfortably with their sense of Germanness.
46
 
As an extension of this, other authors such as Claire Hyland have pointed out that those 
who suggest that an eastern identity precludes a German one, or must be overcome to 
reach German unity imply “that the reunification of Germany is synonymous with the 
westernization of the east.”
47
 Such an assumption suggests that “easternness” is the 
“other” which must be overcome to reach “normalcy” and ignores the potential for 
pluralities within German identity.  
      While these concepts make invaluable contributions to this thesis, those studying the 
memory of the GDR through material culture have made some key mistakes that this 
work aims to correct. The most critical of these is over-generalization. The temptation is 
                                                 
44
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strong, it would seem, to study the memorialization of east Germany through material 
culture holistically, turning to individual representations only to support a larger 
narrative. A holistic focus limits the extent to which singular aspects of east German 
material culture are understood, which has in turn led to misconceptions about east 
German memory, such as its supposed historical groundlessness. The handful of studies 
which focus more narrowly have also neglected to study the relationship between 
easterners and the objects around which their memory revolves. 
      Other criticisms of Ostalgie come from scholars studying the MfS or similar 
institutions of oppression as well as from those who express concerns about its origins 
and content. Mary Fulbrook is one of these critics. She contrasts what she considers an 
authentic yearning for the East German past with “…its capitalist forms of expression, 
namely an Ostalgie…often expressed in objects and products which capitalists and the 
tourist trade were only to [sic] eager to cash in on.”
48
 Paul Cooke expresses similar 
concerns when examining a surge of television shows in which western presenters have 
painted the GDR as “strange and non-western.” “In so doing,” Cooke posits, “the 
programs invite former GDR citizens to join a club of western German consumers and to 
laugh along with them at their bizarre, ridiculous past.”
49
 These critics are not alone as 
the spectre of exploitative capitalism continues to hang over this particular form of 
remembrance. Indeed, much of the commodification of the East German past, either by 
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the tourist trade or by other capitalist industries, has already become a crude and distorted 
“Checkpoint Charlie” version of GDR history.
50
 
      One of the most frequently cited, and also thoroughly misunderstood, examples of 
“Checkpoint Charlie” history is the East German pedestrian traffic light figure, the Ost-
Ampelmännchen (popularly referred to as Ampelmann, see appendices 1 and 2).
51
 East 
German engineer Karl Peglau invented this jolly, hat-wearing traffic light figure in 1961. 
Eight years later, in 1969, the figure made his debut on East German streets. After 
reunification, he became one of the most widely circulated symbols of the GDR.
52
 While 
studies criticizing this figure often hit on critical points, such as the problematic nature of 
his commodification, they often make incorrect or overly general assumptions which 
distort the true nature of this lieu de mémoire. Svetlana Boym, for example, suggests that 
Ampelmann had “no inherent political or cultural symbolism” in the GDR which allowed 
him to become “the biggest fetish of GDR nostalgia.”
53
 This fetishization, Boym posits, 
occurred once the figure was brought back after “all Berlin streetlights were made 
uniform”
54
 by “a more pragmatic West German image.”
55
 Dominik Bartmanski, although 
making some thoroughly insightful points about the figure’s memorialization such as its 
spread into the west, stumbles similarly, repeating Boym when stating that Ampelmann 
had “no inherent cultural symbolism.”
56
 Similarly, in Claire Hyland’s discussion, 
                                                 
50
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Ampelmann “never became politicized,”
57
 an assertion based on a questionnaire posed to 
east Germans (and published in a 2011 article) – a narrow focus of research. In this way, 
scholars studying the eastern traffic light figure, despite the otherwise high quality of 
their works, have misinterpreted Ampelmann either by making false assumptions or 
neglecting more detailed research. 
      This study will build upon these works by examining Ampelmann’s GDR history and 
post-Wall trajectory. This study will, in contrast to many others, examine one site of east 
German remembrance in order to track its history during the GDR era and determine the 
way in which the East German past and reunified, neoliberal, and globalized present have 
been recast in this one example. Ampelmann has had a storied career not just, as many 
critics assert, following reunification but also during the GDR period. By examining the 
ways East Germans have reimagined and resurrected aspects of their past through 
Ampelmann, this thesis will argue against accusations of “mere” nostalgia by showing 
the diverse and complex memories represented in this figure, revealing nuances more 
broadly focused studies have overlooked. 
      In addition, this study examines the ways in which east Germans have used 
Ampelmann to re-examine the present by studying the traffic light figure’s 
commodification and branding. Often, East Germans are portrayed as passive in this 
process, blindly consuming East German symbols drained of their symbolic powers by 
the exploitative forces of capitalism.
58
 In contrast, this study will examine east Germans 
as constructors of their own memory. East Germans are not only conscious their figure’s 
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commodification, they are also aware of what this commodification implies and among 
its most adamant supporters. Through their support for Ampelmann’s commodification, 
easterners have also envisioned a more equitable form of capitalism that is compatible 
with east German values from the GDR. Extending this vision, easterners have used their 
traffic light figure to reveal the ways in which their lives, identity, and values can be 
compatible with and beneficial to those of the west, potentially helping to further German 
unity. By expanding their reimagining of the present to the world, east Germans have 
suggested an alternative which is open and welcoming while appreciating eastern 
innovation, history, and local diversity. This image of an alternative world aligns with – 
although it is more moderate than – those suggested by new social movements, positing a 
world where the unchecked rule of neoliberal hegemony is restricted while social services 
and local values are expanded. 
      This is not to suggest, however, that those bringing Ampelmann to market are doing 
so altruistically. While, in this specific case, the marketing of Ampelmann has often been 
done with respect paid to easterners and their values, money is still a key motivating 
factor for those selling Ampelmann merchandise and it is unlikely that this would be 
done without a healthy profit.
59
 Likewise, the more equitable world imagined by east 
Germans is not necessarily reflected in reality. Nevertheless, through their traffic light 
figure east Germans have taken values and rituals from their past, used them to suggest 
improvements to German unity, capitalism, and globalization, and envisioned a present 
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where eastern values and identity are respected and made compatible with existing 
structures. 
      The framework of memory will be critical to understanding just how Ampelmann 
functions in this way. Given the absence of the GDR and its traditions after reunification, 
the soil of post-Wall Germany is fertile for - to borrow Pierre Nora’s term - the lieux de 
mémoire around which memory revolves, to take root. This “moment of lieux de 
mémoire,” Nora asserts, “occurs at the same time that an immense and intimate fund of 
memory disappears, surviving only as a reconstituted object beneath the gaze of critical 
history.”
60
 These sites furthermore exist as an attempt to preserve an identity and sense of 
community in times when these are threatened: 
[They] make their appearance by virtue of the deritualization of our world – 
producing, manifesting, constructing, decreeing, and maintaining by artifice and by 
will a society deeply absorbed in its own transformation and renewal, one that 




East Germany, given its integration into a vastly different capitalist system, is prime 
territory for the reconstruction of its memory along such lines. Memory forms around the 
present, as Maurice Halbwachs asserts: “…even at the moment of reproducing the past 
our imagination remains under the influence of the present social milieu.”
62
 This memory 
is, furthermore, collective in the sense that “groups provide us the stimulus or opportunity 
to recall; they also shape the ways in which we do so, and often provide the materials.”
63
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      The distinction between memory and history is also crucial here. While “history is 
unitary, and it can be said that there is only one history”
64
 memory is, by its very nature, 
plural and widely variant. Lieux de mémoire, consequently, “exist because of their 
capacity for metamorphosis, an endless recycling of their meaning and an unpredictable 
proliferation of their ramifications.”
65
 In this way memory is subject to constant working 
and re-working as its meaning and value in the present is redefined according to 
contemporary conditions and the needs of those remembering. Forgetting those parts of 
the past deemed incompatible with this narrative is therefore just as important as what is 
being remembered:  
...for the historians of memory, the “truth” of a given memory lies not so much in its 




 Memory is thus complex and the symbols which represent it  
…are simple and ambiguous, natural and artificial, at once immediately available in a 
concrete sensual experience and susceptible to the most abstract elaboration. Indeed, 
they are lieux in three senses of the word – material, symbolic, and functional. Even 
an apparently purely material site…becomes a lieu de mémoire only if the 
imagination invests it with a symbolic aura.
67
  
Finally, this identity formation and alternative view of the past can be threatening as 
“memories by marginalized or subordinated groups are, by virtue of their form or content, 
regarded as problematic, disturbing.”
68
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      In order to tap into this stream of memory, this study will use a variety of primary 
sources. Newspapers and other periodical publications are the most prominent of these. 
These include ones targeted towards a more eastern audience such as Berliner Zeitung, 
Neues Deutschland, and Mitteldeutsche Zeitung, among others.
69
 These will be buttressed 
by objects of material culture and other relevant publications produced by Ampel-
advocates. Through these sources, this study will aim to discern the way easterners have 
utilized their traffic light figure to re-write and make usable their past but also to 
determine how they have interpreted his commodification. West German publications
70
 
as well as newspapers and official documents from the GDR
71
 have been used when 
relevant in order to provide context to this study’s claims. These sources provide a small 
sample of contemporary German memories. Furthermore, although publications from 
various organizations and political perspectives have been included and weighed against 
each other, the views presented in them are limited by the hegemony of west Germany 
and neoliberalism. This reality is perhaps in part responsible for easterners’ acceptance of 
capitalist and west German values examined in chapters 3 and 4.
72
 Nevertheless, one of 
the most remarkable things shown by this study is the critical dialogue presented against 
neoliberalism and globalization by easterners through Ampelmann. 
      Within this framework, Ampelmann functions on many seemingly contradictory 
levels. Across his pre- and post-unification journey, he has shown a remarkable capacity 
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for metamorphosis, bringing forth many visions of the past and present as East Germans 
attempt to navigate their past and make it usable. It is this extraordinary capacity which, 
paradoxically, both undermines and reinforces German unity, capitalism, and 
globalization as easterners reconstitute their past with the aim of revising these 
institutions so that they may become compatible with eastern heritage.  
      In order to provide historical context to this remembrance, Chapter 1 will examine 
Ampelmann’s role within traffic safety culture during the GDR era. In contrast to those 
claiming that Ampelmann had no symbolic value in the GDR, this chapter reveals that he 
was part of a much wider programme which aimed to create a culture of safety directed at 
adults and children alike. Ampelmann’s role in this, both on his television show and in 
the classroom, was important in developing his symbolic power and paving the way for 
his post-Wall career. Other factors are critical here as well, since East Germans would 
later attempt to resurrect the GDR’s traffic safety concerns and rituals. 
      Chapter 2 examines the post-Wall memorialization of the GDR through Ampelmann. 
It argues that Ampelmann served as a mnemonic bridge to the past through which east 
Germans could bring selected ideals from East Germany to the present. Simultaneously, 
East Germans attempted to re-create and re-define eastern identity and a sense of 
community. In this narrative the GDR appeared safe, secure, and innocent in a way the 
modern Berlin Republic was not. The complexity, variety, and nature of these 
reconstructions moves beyond other scholars’ allegations that the hat-wearing traffic light 
man is ‘merely’ a fetishized commodity. 
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      Chapter 3 explores the little studied relationship between Ampelmann and west 
Germany. Here, Ampelmann’s interaction with the west and its capitalism is evaluated in 
detail. Examining eastern interpretations of Ampelmann’s commodification and spread 
into the west reveals how east Germans have reinterpreted the socialist past and made it 
compatible with the capitalist present. In reimaging their past and present, east Germans 
show that a defined sense of eastern values and identity does not preclude German unity 
but rather aims to contribute to it by proposing a more equitable form of capitalism. 
      The global expansion of Ampelmann, particularly his spread into Japan and South 
Korea, has functioned in similar ways. Chapter 4 examines the interplay between visions 
of the global and local as east Germans used their traffic light figure to imagine a world 
where the eastern past could be respected and valued by people around the globe. This 
narrative of success aimed to abate fears associated with globalization as the local has all 
too frequently been subjugated to the whims of international capitalism. By using their 
past to suggest an alternative to the current structure of globalization, east Germans have 
integrated themselves into a global network of new social movements which aims to limit 
unchecked neoliberal hegemony. 
      Ultimately then, Ampelmann is a lieu de mémoire with impressive symbolic power. 
He is able to navigate the turbulent space between the East German past and the unified, 
neoliberal, and globalized present. Through him, East Germans have attempted to 
resurrect select ideals and rituals from their past in order to preserve them and forge an 
eastern identity. East Germans have also used Ampelmann to imagine a present (and 
future) where east German values, history, and culture are appreciated. In short order, 
then, and unlike in the early years following reunification, traffic lights became one of the 
22 
 
first things on many east German minds as they used Ampelmann to reimagine their past 
to forge a better, more egalitarian present and future.  
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Chapter 1: Crossing the Past: Ampelmann, Traffic Safety, and Traffic Safety 
Culture in the GDR 
      Unsurprisingly, Ampelmann’s post-Wall success has its roots in the GDR where the 
dangers posed by East German streets compelled officials to find innovative solutions. 
Starting in the late 1960s and lasting until the state’s collapse, traffic and traffic safety 
loomed consistently in the GDR’s imagination. There were many reasons behind this, 
ranging from establishing the GDR as a “modern” state, satisfying (or at least appearing 
to satisfy) economic and environmental responsibilities, as well as out of genuine concern 
for its citizens, particularly children and the elderly. The government and the population 
as a whole attempted to rectify traffic safety issues through both technical solutions such 
as traffic lights and pedagogical ones, instructing the population on proper street safety. 
State officials also adopted less direct tactics such as creating, spreading, and enforcing a 
culture of traffic safety.  
      The state solved some traffic safety issues by enforcing the idea that traffic safety 
ought to be a shared responsibility among all inhabitants of the GDR. This culture was 
enforced through the bold-faced public shaming of offenders, as well as more subtle 
narratives in state publications. Educating children, both in and outside of the classroom, 
was another critical part of this process. To this end, officials dispatched the traffic 
police, in addition to teachers, to instruct youth on traffic safety and to give hands-on, 
multi-media demonstrations.  Ampelmann emerged here as a tool to help children learn 
about proper street caution, appearing in traffic police presentations as well as in a 
television show, granting the figure both recognition and effectiveness. Traffic safety and 
24 
 
education were prominent in the GDR, highlighting both the state’s concern for the well-
being of its citizens and Ampelmann’s entrenchment in the lives of East Germans.
73
 
Traffic Problems in the GDR 
      Officials and state publications first began expressing concerns about the increasing 
volume of traffic and its implications in the late 1960s.
74
 The emergence of these 
concerns coincided roughly with the introduction of Ampelmann onto East German 
streets in 1969. Swelling traffic and soaring accident rates demanded solutions from the 
East German government. In outlining these issues, state publications, as well as internal 
documents, consistently refer to them as ‘modern’ problems faced by a ‘modern’ state.
75
 
The Berlin Department of Electricity further revealed this in a document proposing 
solutions to traffic issues in Alexanderplatz, East Berlin. It declared that: “Every day 
major cities around the world face the same image: overcrowded roads,” thus placing 
East Berlin’s dilemmas alongside those of major world cities.
76
 State-run papers echoed 
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the message, describing how “automatic traffic lights” could solve the problems incurred 
by the “modernization of the streets.”
77
 In the modern city, they continued, “instead of a 
traffic post, a traffic light has taken over control [of the streets].”
78
 Stressing the 
modernity of these problems implied the innovativeness of their solutions. This 
discourse, along with the desire to ‘keep up’ both with other countries and the desires of 
the GDR’s own population, coloured the state’s approach to problems of traffic and 
traffic safety.  
      These descriptions also showcase real problems which the GDR faced as street traffic 
increased, thus mandating practical solutions: “Traffic engineers and city planners face a 
difficult problem to solve with all too familiar consequences such as rising accident rates, 
pudding-like traffic flows, traffic jams, and excessive demands on drivers and the 
economy.”
79
 “The rapid growth of traffic on the streets of our city [East Berlin],” writes 
the Berlin Electrical Department in 1961, “brings with it a reduction in the fluidity, speed, 
and safety of traffic.”
80
 But the frequency and tenor of official publications which 
emphasized the GDR’s ‘modernity’ suggests that image-making, depicting the GDR as a 
forward-thinking and vanguard state, was another aim of East German traffic solutions. 
      Other concerns fueled the GDR’s desire to seek innovative answers to the question of 
traffic safety. One of the most pressing issues was soaring accident rates, particularly at 
crossings: “it has been the tendency for years that the amount of accidents at traffic lights 
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 The seriousness of the problem, as well as the care and 
concern of the state for the well-being of its citizens, is reflected in the vast array of 
statistics published in state newspapers. On a yearly, often monthly, basis, state 
newspapers lamented the number of accidents occurring on GDR streets, providing 
shockingly detailed breakdowns of where these accidents occurred and who was at fault. 
“The accident rate for pedestrians,” Berliner Zeitung lamented “has increased every year 
since 1967. This year [1971] there were 1197. This is 22.7% of all accidents. 1337 
pedestrians were injured and 89 died.”
82
 Another paper provided even more detail, 
describing how, up to mid-August 1983, there were 3122 accidents in East Berlin, a 
“14.4% increase from the previous year, 44 people died, 1681 were injured.”
83
 The paper 
continued: “the main causes of accidents were excessive speed (20%), unpermitted 




      The authors of these articles found the frequency of accidents at traffic lights notably 
troubling. Although most official publications accepted that “crossings and junctions with 
traffic lights, in contrast to those without, are safer,”
85
 many agreed that “the accidents 
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which occur at light-regulated crossings are relatively high.”
86
 Neue Zeit described how 
in 1974 “from the first of January to the 27
th
 of March there were 956 accidents on the 
streets of the capital, most of them at crossings and junctions where 939 Berliners were 
injured.”
87
 Such concerns continued and, in 1984, 32.6% of all accidents occurred at 
crossings with traffic lights.
88
  
      As disconcerting as the more general statistics were, officials in the GDR seemed 
particularly worried about the rate of accidents involving children and the elderly. In the 
first three months of 1971, for example, accident rates increased by 5.8% (when 
compared to the same period in 1970) to 1221, 238 of which involved pedestrians. “Of 
these [pedestrians] there were 94 children and 74 older citizens…” a number which the 
paper described as “disproportionate.”
89
 Another publication outlined accidents in 1983 
according to age groups, citing how, out of every 100, 000 residents, children between 
the ages of 3 and 9 were guilty of causing 82 accidents, 6 to 9 year olds 105, 9 to 14 years 
olds 102, and 14 to 25 year olds - by contrast –a meagre 48.
90
 The implications of this 
were disturbing as “every fourth accident in 1984 was caused by a child less than 6 years 
of age.”
91
 The year 1985 saw no improvement as traffic accidents injured 3850 children 
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with an additional 100 losing their lives.
92
 The elderly fared little better. In 1970, official 
publications warned older people with poor sight to avoid “peak hours for traffic during 
months where it gets dark earlier. In the fourth quarter of 1970, 80% of pedestrians killed 
or injured after 16:00 were over 60 years of age.”
93
  
      The GDR was aware of the cost, in human terms, of poor traffic safety. The 
impressive (and perhaps disturbing) multitude of statistics the GDR possessed to this end 
shows the state’s commitment to discovering the nation’s own failings and to improving 
the lives of its citizens with a particular focus on the most vulnerable groups in East 
German society. The focus placed on children and the elderly by the East German state 
would later become a key point around which the memory of the GDR would revolve. 
      The wealth of information they possessed made officials in the GDR conscious of the 
implications of traffic accidents and regulation beyond the direct effects of these 
calamities on drivers and pedestrians. One of the main problems faced by the GDR in this 
regard was the high economic cost of traffic accidents and inefficiencies. Official 
publications highlighted this: “in the direction of Weißensee a moving Wartburg rolls. As 
he locks his breaks he bounces against a moving Trabant. 2000 Marks in material 
damages.”
94
 In another situation, “a pedestrian carelessly walked into the street at a 
crossing, causing a car to crash into the light and the pedestrian to be hospitalized. This 
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caused 4000 Marks in damage!”
95
 The significance of this is underlined by the 
inefficiencies of GDR manufacturing, which limited the availability of products such as 
car parts. Indeed, Ina Merkel has described how one could rarely purchase parts for a 
Trabant, forcing savvy socialist consumers to buy what parts they could and hoard them 
until they were needed.
96
  
      Environmental concerns also presented themselves in internal official discourse, 
although these concerns were significantly less pronounced. The Ministry for 
Transportation, for example, included environmental concerns under its 1983 “General 
guidelines for Traffic concepts,” with a section entitled, “the calming of traffic and 
environmental protection.”
97
 Here, the ministry declared that “in general, the planning 
and realization of all traffic organization measures [must] consider environmental issues.” 
And that “in the main street networks of the inner city, the normative [regulations 
concerning] noise and exhaust pollution are not being met but can certainly be met in the 
near future.”
98
 In this way, then, the GDR possessed a wealth of information which 
allowed officials to grasp the wider implications of traffic issues, including the personal, 
material, and environmental costs that resulted from inefficient roads. 
Traffic Solutions and Traffic Safety Culture in the GDR 
      In tackling issues of traffic safety, East German officials were hoping not only to ease 
the economic burden of poorly managed streets but also to improve the lives of its 
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citizens and meet their expectations. The Ministry for Transportation, along with various 
other government agencies, discussed the desire to meet East German expectations in its 
1980 plan “for the regulation of street traffic with traffic lights in the cities of the GDR by 
1985,” declaring that: 
With the growth of efficiency and the national economy as well as the increase in the 
standard of living of the socialist community in the GDR, the safe and economical 
regulation of transportation gains an increasing importance. The decisive criteria of 
this are the smoothness and safety of traffic organization as well as the reliability and 
availability of modern technical measures.
99
 
This reveals a desire to match realities in the GDR with the expectations of the 
population, aiming to do so through the regulation of traffic with traffic lights. This 
would ensure the “swift and safe flow of traffic,” improve “the safety and comfort of 
pedestrians,” and ameliorate “pedestrian traffic in living areas.”
100
 GDR officials were 
both aware of and concerned with the problems they faced with regard to traffic and 
traffic safety. 
      The first step on the path to a traffic solution was the implementation and co-
ordination of traffic lights into a series of so-called “green waves” that would allow 
drivers adhering to proper speed limits to cross through busy intersections without 
stopping.
101
 Through regulating traffic lights officials hoped that safety would be 
increased, serious accidents reduced, time saved, and a stronger feeling of safety forged. 
Engineers employed by the Berlin Electrical Department declared in 1968 that  
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An automatic traffic light, along with a means of suitable programming, allows for 
street traffic to be safely and quickly led through street crossings. This allows for 
drivers to drive more safely, more quickly, and with less waiting times, particularly 
when lights are co-ordinated through a so-called “green wave.”
102
 
The disadvantages of poorly managed traffic signals, a 1976 document from the college 
of transportation, further asserts, “can be seen during peak periods. This leads to loss of 
time which could, however, be saved through more appropriate methods of signaling.”
103
 
The faith put in the green wave system is reflected again in state media coverage. 
Berliner Zeitung wrote on the effectiveness of “green wave” lights in 1971, reporting that 
“the number of accidents in Karl-Marx-Allee where the green wave was implemented has 
also sunk considerably.”
104
 A year later, Neues Deutschland agreed, stating that “The 
traffic police inform us that the number of accidents has been reduced after the 
introduction of the green wave. Drivers and pedestrians have adjusted well to each other, 
particularly when drivers are turning right.”
105
 The green wave system was thus one 
method GDR officials used in attempting to solve traffic problems. Furthermore, the 
green wave was arguably the most direct, practical solution examined in contrast to other 
methods directed at educating the population and creating a culture of traffic safety. 
      State representatives continued to search for solutions in traffic lights. In 1978, 
“Central analysis and evaluation of accidents caused by the failure of a traffic light” 
spawned the introduction of a new Quality Assurance System (QSS) under the 
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supervision of the Minister of Transportation.
106
 He, in turn, was “responsible, according 
to the statute of the Ministry for Transportation, to ensure traffic safety through facilities 
and technologies.”
107
 Functionally, QSS consisted of stricter measures regarding the 
production, testing, and control of traffic lights. It aimed to “minimize the strains on 
technology and people,” increase the “permeability of traffic flow” and limit the “impact 
on the environment.”
108
 A key aspect of this was the “international exchange of 
experiences with the USSR and its socialist countries” in order to help with “questions of 
testing, control, measuring and organizational abilities.”
109
  
Given yearly increases in traffic, it remains difficult to assess how effective both 
the green wave program and QSS were, but they nevertheless display how the GDR was 
attempting to find a modern solution to the problems of traffic and traffic safety. The 
existence of these systems and the effort the state expended in implementing them – even 
co-operating with other socialist countries – shows the concern, care, and seriousness 
with which GDR officials attempted to tackle traffic issues. 
      State representatives also attempted to forge a culture of traffic safety in order to help 
solve street safety problems. The central aim of this culture was to characterize traffic 
safety, in the minds of the East German population, as a shared responsibility. A writer 
for Berliner Zeitung revealed this in 1973, stating that: “the responsibility for traffic 
safety is shared: State organs, social organizations and individual citizens have an equal 
                                                 
106
 SAPMO-Barch, DM 1 15912, Zentrale Abteilung: HV Straßenwesen, “Qualitäts sicherungssystem 
Lichtsignalanlagen.” 1978. 
107









The Ministry for Transportation outlined this culture further in 1983: 
“through targeted and informative public relations activities, the understanding of the 
citizens for the designated traffic organizational measures can be aroused and cooperative 
societal powers will be activated.”
111
 On one level, east German traffic safety culture 
endeavoured to outline the shared responsibility between drivers and pedestrians on East 
German roads. State publications frequently targeted drivers as the guilty party. Speaking 
of drivers who had their licenses taken away, one reporter wrote that “mostly it is these 
same drivers who ignore good advice and warnings and do not participate in the traffic 
safety education of the social collective.”
112
 In this way, irresponsible and selfish drivers 
were depicted as being guilty in causing traffic accidents, thus shirking their duty to the 
larger collective.  
       State publications also targeted pedestrians for violating the social contract. A Berlin 
City councillor highlighted this shared obligation: “both pedestrians and drivers are 
responsible for this increase [in traffic accidents].”
113
 This position was frequently 
asserted “[…]of course not all pedestrians are angels” wrote another East German 
reporter, “three little girls, for example, ran across the street just a few meters before the 
street crossing at the busy Karl-Liebknecht street. They endanger themselves and 
others.”
114
 Another journalist wrote: “When nearly a quarter of those injured in traffic 
accidents are pedestrians, then we have to make it clear: Caution and consideration are 
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the first rules of traffic safety, not just for drivers but for pedestrians as well.”
115
 In this 
way, state officials and publications engaged in a cultural program aimed at creating a 
more unified and considerate socialist population of drivers and pedestrians. 
      Sometimes, this approach was far more direct than merely reasserting a socialist 
ideal; occasionally official publications publicly shamed those who violated their 
communal duty. Drivers, easily identified by their licence plates, were vulnerable to these 
attacks in the press. Two drivers were targeted in 1972 when Neues Deutschland reported 
that “[…] two cars forced their right of way over two pedestrians. A red Skoda IT 20-82 
and a blue Moskwitsch IE 01-20.”
116
 Pedestrians were not, however, immune to such 
criticisms. Berliner Zeitung, for example, attempted to discover why pedestrians were 
being so reckless by interviewing locals reporters saw violating traffic laws. Frau Gisela 
Troschke was the target of one such interrogation, responding after “she crossed the street 
on a red” that “I’ll be alright I watch out! Ultimately it’s about time. My family is waiting 
at home…” The paper retorted “what would happen if Frau Toschke’s family had to wait 
one day because – and we hope it doesn’t happen - she has been the victim of a traffic 
accident?”
117
 Such bold inquiries were not uncommon as GDR publications pulled few 
punches in criticising those who irresponsibly and selfishly violated traffic regulations. 
Some resented this, such as one lady who, when confronted about crossing on a red, 
declared “I am not a marionette that dances to the colours of the traffic light.”
118
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Occasionally, however, publications commended those who displayed care and attention 
during their commute: “Our compliments to the driver of a “wolga” IB 72-69 who, due to 
his careful driving, allowed pedestrians to safely cross while making a right turn.”
119
 In 
this way, the East German state strove to change traffic safety culture in the GDR by 
forging the idea that this was a shared, socialist responsibility, enforcing this belief by 
publicly criticizing violators while praising the obedient. 
      Children played a particular role in this collective as one of the most vulnerable 
groups. As a result, the state used children to enforce the cultural ideal of traffic safety. 
Indeed, state papers highlighted the endangered state of children, pointing out how in 
September “thousands of children will be going back to school and, thus, becoming 
independent traffic participants.”
120
 Another article played on parental anxieties:  
From their very first step, a child becomes a traffic participant. First they are well 
protected in the hands of their parents or older siblings. But eventually they want to 
venture out on their own. No mother, no father can keep their children protected 
every hour of the day. And so eventually, parents, with rattling hearts, have to let their 
offspring go, protected only by good advice, to play on their own. An everyday 




In this way parents were targeted as being responsible for the safety of their children. 
State periodicals outlined what parents ought to do to ensure this: “…parents should 
practice the way to school with their children once again. Not the shortest, but rather the 
safest route must be planned. Ideally, children should be led through crossings, T-
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junctions, as well as pedestrian bridges and tunnels.”
122
  One article stressed the extent of 
this responsibility: “…it is particularly important… that adults set a proper example for 
children” before warning that “frequently girls and boys see adults going against what the 
children learn in school. They also see that these reckless activities are tolerated in the 
outside world.”
123
 The East German state thus attempted to forge a communal obligation 
towards traffic safety, focusing particularly on children in order to create consent by 
playing off of children’s vulnerability, and by reiterating the key role of all adults in 
protecting the GDR’s youngest citizens. 
      Traffic safety education, particularly as it was enforced in schools, was another key 
factor in shielding children against the dangers of street traffic. Students learned songs 
teaching them the rules of traffic safety, drew pictures, and read instructional posters.
124
 
One teacher also used toy cars to illustrate proper street safety, clarifying in the mind of 
one East German youth that “when the light is red, I must stay.”
125
 State newspapers 
asserted that the relationship between students and their teacher was key here, as one 
reporter posited: “when children have a good base of knowledge with regard to traffic 
safety, this can be attributed to the hard work of their teacher.”
126
 Similar examples were 
frequently repeated, constructing the image of concerned, compassionate teachers 
connecting with their students through various instructional methods. Teacher Christa 
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Kehr, quoted by a reporter for Neues Deutschland, epitomized this image, declaring that 
“we can’t begin helping the children to form good habits early enough.”
127
  
      The ‘Golden One’ award, given to children who demonstrated exceptional 
understanding of traffic safety concerns, was another element in the education of East 
German youths. Indeed, the competition for this award gave structure to the traffic safety 
education of students from the first to fourth grades.
128
 By 1987, Berliner Zeitung 
claimed that 1.5 million children earned the Golden One every year “for showing good 
understanding and [taking] proper actions with regard to traffic safety.”
129
 The very 
existence of this award, as well as the sheer volume of students who were given it, 
reveals the significance of traffic safety to the East German government as well as to the 
population at large. Across the myriad elements of traffic safety education in the GDR, 
then, the state attempted to protect its citizens, both young and old, from the hazards of 
the modern city, providing information, education and attempting to create a culture, 
sometimes boldly enforced, of traffic safety. 
      The East German Traffic Police also participated in the population’s education 
through several initiatives ranging from visiting schools, holding instructional events, and 
issuing warnings. These initiatives show not only the importance of traffic safety 
concerns to the GDR, but furthermore illuminate the pervasiveness of traffic safety 
culture. Visits to schools were one of the most common ways traffic police contributed to 
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the protection of East German youths. The methods police used were multi-faceted. In the 
district of Magdeburg, for example, “for a more vivid learning experience, the traffic 
police distributed… 15,000 book marks, 14,000 colouring books, and about 20,000 paper 
models of traffic lights.”
130
 In another situation, police visited a school in a radio car, 
handing out illustrated books, winter hats and whistles. Afterwards the schoolchildren 
were quizzed: “they [the students] could already answer why one must find the quickest 
way to cross the street, not to play on traffic barriers and not to cross from behind parked 
cars.” As a reward for their knowledge, “they [the students] were allowed to go into the 
police radio car, speak into the microphone, and play with the siren.”
131
 Describing a 




     Outside of the classroom as well, police helped to teach children about proper street 
precautions. In Lichtenberg, traffic police set up a series of games outside to advise 
children on traffic safety. In one of these called, “on the way to the playground,” a ball 
was rolled out into the street and children had to put it back safely into their net. In 
another, they had to help a “sick” schoolmate, whose eyes were covered, get safely 
home.
133
 In this way, traffic police inserted themselves into the traffic safety education of 
the country’s youngest citizens, forging a connection with the children they instructed 
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through playful but pragmatic activities. The gifts given out by traffic police also helped 
to establish a link in the GDR between traffic safety and material culture, a trend which 
would appear again after East Germany’s collapse. 
      Traffic police also used more traditional methods in order to reach out to the 
community and assist in furthering traffic safety. To this end, they frequently published 
messages in newspapers across the GDR, under the headline “The traffic police 
report.”
134
 With these, the traffic police warned citizens about, for example, icy road 
conditions, advised them to cross only at marked crossings, and warned pedestrians about 
paths blocked off by construction.
135
 In October 1973 the traffic police even hosted a 
“traffic safety education week” where they held forums instructing drivers and 
pedestrians on how to prepare for winter conditions.
136
 They also helped to alleviate early 
morning traffic jams: “…the traffic police spring into action… making it clear which 
driver has the right of the way. And when the modern traffic lights can do nothing, the 
traffic controller takes their [the officer’s] scepter into their hand.”
137
 The traffic police 
focused their efforts on educating not just children but adults as well, extending even 
further the connection between the state and a detailed, extensive, compassionate, and 
paternalistic traffic safety education program. 
                                                 
134
 Occasionally, these announcements were also released by the Volkspolizei, although the content of these 
proclamations does not differ significantly. 
135
 See, for example, “Die Verkehrspolizei meldet Unfallzeugen gesucht,” Berliner Zeitung, August 25, 
1972, http://zefys.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/ddr-presse/ergebnisanzeige/?purl=SNP26120215-19720825-0-




 W.H. Kraus, “Vor dem Schaden klug sein,” Neue Zeit, September 21, 1973. http://zefys.staatsbibliothek-
berlin.de/ddr-presse/ergebnisanzeige/?purl=SNP2612273X-19730921-0-6-118-0 
137





      There was already a well-established traffic safety effort by the time Ampelmann 
emerged in 1984. Among these components of traffic safety, Ampelmann found a place 
as a tool to teach children about proper street caution. The traffic police were key in 
establishing the traffic light figure as a pedagogical instrument. Following Ampelmann’s 
television debut in September 1984, the traffic police announced that  
In order to better protect children from the dangers of traffic, the ‘Ampelmännchen’ 
has been chosen as a traffic education symbol for children up to the age of 7.  In order 
to align with the psyche of children –learning through play – the red and green 




The framework was thus laid for the expansion of Ampelmann into the classroom. Traffic 
police distributed Ampelmann figurines to school children as the officers visited 
schools.
139
 The figure quickly proved popular amongst East German children; following a 
lesson from local traffic police, “the children thanked the traffic police with the 
‘Ampelmännchen’ song.”
140
 Officers even instructed parents how to use the figures to 
teach their children lessons: “These figures can also play a role during walks – if parents 
and children make a mistake, they should go over the advice of the green Ampelmann. 
Such playful education is useful as a warning.”
141
 “With the leadership of the 
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      The most pervasive representation of Ampelmann in the GDR was, nevertheless, the 
television show Stiefelchen und Kompaßkalle which debuted on 24 September 1984. 
Here, animated red and green figures appeared to warn the titular characters, a young girl 
and boy respectively, along with their dog Wuffi, about dangerous traffic situations and 
provide advice.
143
 The show aired along with the popular evening program 
Sandmännchen and thus reached a wide audience of East German children. GDR officials 
first commissioned the show in 1982 as they decided to begin using television to teach 
traffic safety to children directly (previous shows had been aimed at an adult 
audience).
144
 “We are assigning you,” declared the letter sent to the soon-to-be director of 
the show, Friedrich Rochow, “a child-friendly series for preschool and elementary aged 
children to appear once a month during the Sandmännchen program.”
145
 It was aimed, in 
part, to fill the gap created by the “golden one” award, which was available for children 
in grades one through four but not preschool. Rochow recalled in 1997 that “Preschool 




      The five minute stories which made up the Ampelmann show were taken, according 
to the show’s writer, Nils Werner, “right out of the lives of children” and were intended 
to “hold up a mirror before their faces.”
147
 The characters in the show were also intended 
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to be “representative of all children.”
148
 The counsel given in the show was wide-ranging. 
The red Ampelmann sprang up on screen when the children walked out behind a parked 
car to chase after a ball, for example, crying “Stop!” The green figure, by contrast, 
appeared when the children showed proper caution such as safely crossing the street, 
declaring, “Well done!”
149
 Research for the show was extensive as the creators consulted 
Rolf Wieczorek who did his Ph.D. research on traffic accidents involving children.
150
 
Wieczorek was given the task not only of coming up with themes for each film but even 
chose Ampelmann as the show’s star after determining that “children in this age group 
were best able to recognize the red and green Ampelmännchen.”
151
 Ampelmann’s 
television show, then, was key in establishing a connection between the figure and the 
children of the GDR. 
      Police also invited children to an “Ampelmännchen party” in Berlin.
152
 The 
preparations for this were extensive; police constructed mock streets, roadways and 
pedestrian crossings, even installing a traffic light. Aided by this elaborate practice area, 
police and educators coached students on proper street safety, rewarding those who did 
well with “a certificate and small gifts.”
153
 In this way, Ampelmann played a crucial role 
in the education of young East Germans, as his image appeared both in the classes taught 
by traffic police and on a popular television show.  Ampelmann’s friendly, 
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compassionate, and sympathetic stature is thus not, as will be shown in the following 
chapters, limited to post-Wall Germany. Instead, his profile was forged, however briefly, 
in the GDR as the little man jumped out of the traffic lights and into the lives of children. 
      The GDR was intricately involved in traffic safety, taking various precautions in 
attempting to ensure the security of its population. To this end, the state instigated a series 
of pragmatic measures aimed at better regulating traffic lights, attempted to create a 
culture of traffic safety and encouraged traffic safety education. Along with teachers and 
the traffic police, Ampelmann appeared here as an educational tool, helping to reinforce 
lessons and connect with children. These points are crucial, as will be revealed in the 
succeeding chapters, to the way the GDR as a whole and Ampelmann specifically would 
be remembered after the state’s collapse. The care, concern, and safety present in GDR 
life would become among the most popular traits that east Germans missed when 
comparing their lives in the Berlin Republic to East Germany. Indeed, through 
Ampelmann, east Germans, as we will see, attempted to resurrect some aspects of GDR 
traffic safety culture. Ampelmann, too, was shaped by his time in the GDR as easterners 
looked back to his friendliness, connection to children, and familiarity. Material culture, 
and Ampelmann’s specific connection to it, would also prove significant in the figure’s 
post-Wall career. In much the same way that the GDR attempted to improve its world 
through the use of the East German traffic light figure, easterners would use their traffic 





Chapter 2: Recasting the Past: Ampelmann and the Creation of a Usable GDR 
      Ampelmann’s television career and role as an icon of traffic safety were cut short by 
the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989. As the cultural landscape of the GDR 
was ripped up, the hat-wearing traffic light man quickly found himself, like many other 
easterners, unemployed. Indeed, no special measures were taken to protect him. Things 
only got worse as the replacement of Ampelmann traffic lights began in 1992 when the 
federal government started an initiative to standardize traffic signals by implementing the 
more generic western figure.
154
 Western-style logic fueled this, suggesting that a unified 
traffic light system made more sense and would be cheaper to produce. Furthermore, the 
western figure was supposedly easier to integrate into computer networks, allowing for 
the modernization of traffic systems.
155
 
      During this time, with the idealized image of the west still burning bright, easterners 
accepted these ideas, repeating the economic and logistical rationale behind the spread of 
the western figure. Some saw this as a natural process, arguing that the “slim, tall, athletic 
and gender neutral” western figure “could guide everyone equally.”
156
 Here, ‘gender 
neutrality’ was praised as representing an equality not possessed by the ‘male’ eastern 
figure. Extending this logic, the western figure came to represent the modernity which the 
eastern one did not, the former being slim and fit while the latter was round and bulbous. 
This paints the image of a sleek, modern west and an antiquated, bloated GDR. 
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      Yet as the idealized image of the west faded and a paradoxical nostalgia for the GDR 
became increasingly apparent, popular sentiment in the east began to shift in favour of 
resurrecting the “funny man with the hat.”
157
 These sentiments began to take hold in 1996 
when Jörg Davids formed the Save the Ampelmännchen Committee (Committee zur 
Rettung des Ampelmännchens), and the western entrepreneur Markus Heckhausen began 
selling lamps fashioned from decommissioned Ampelmann lights.
158
 The Committee 
funded its efforts by selling Ampelmann-adorned souvenirs ranging from coffee cups to 
T-shirts, from vodka (the ‘drink of pedestrians’) to an Ampelmann CD: “Berlin – 
Soundtrack to the City.”
159
 Committee members made national headlines as they paraded 
through the streets of Berlin, shouting their slogan ‘lasst es laufen’ (let it run).
160
 Davids 
himself became the subject of several interviews where he spoke out in favour of 
Ampelmann specifically and the former east in general. In one such interview with Neues 
Deutschland, Davids summarized his vision of the new Germany, saying that he saw 
himself not as an easterner or westerner but rather a Berliner and that “Today, I see in the 
new States new possibilities for this Republic [the GDR] to use its critical potential 
against the mindset of the Old States.”
161
 One later article looking back on this period 
even went so far as to claim that Davids’ art firm, Mondos Art (which was responsible for 
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many of the Ampelmann products at this time), invented the term Ostalgie.
162
  Officials, 
too, began to step up in defense of Ampelmann. In response to a slew of newspaper 
articles and cries for the return of Ampelmann, the transportation minister of Saxony-
Anhalt decided to save the figure in 1997, saying that he was “very likable for many 
people” and stood in contrast to the “genderless” western figure.
163
 For his efforts to save 
Ampelmann, the Save the Ampelmännchen Committee gave the minister an award. 
Similar initiatives spread across the east. In Weimar, for example, the decision to 
preserve Ampelmann was made on 27 July 1998 supported by a 2,000 Mark grant from 
the state Ministry of the Interior.
164
 
      Perhaps more significant in the defense of Ampelmann, however, was the 
overwhelming popular support the figure rapidly gained following its resurrection. The 
public, it seemed, was drawn to Ampelmann because he was more likeable, cuter, easier 
to see, and more practical. As Ampelmann became the embodiment of those aspects of 
the GDR past worth preserving, he also served as a means through which east Germans 
could reimagine their former home.
165
 Carrying the good aspects of the GDR into the 
present while simultaneously expressing resentment against the west, he served to re-
create a sense of shared history and community amongst easterners. This identity was 
fostered not only by their shared, idealized past but also by communal rhythms (through 
both controlled traffic patterns and traffic safety education) and the hope that east 
Germans could contribute to the new Germany on their own terms. 
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Easternness, Socialism and Ampelmann 
      Those characteristics of Ampelmann deemed practical and eastern formed the shape 
of this mould. Ampelmann embodied the message that “some eastern things are better 
than those in the west.”
166
 Easterners applauded his large shape, which allowed him to 
give off more light and made him easily visible to pedestrians of all kinds: adults, but 
also children, the elderly, and the colourblind. The green man’s legs “energetically” 
stretched out “like an arrow” while the red man held his hands out, clearly indicating 
whether or not it was safe to cross.
167
 In this way, the defenses of Ampelmann were not 
always emotional but also adopted the west’s own rhetoric in order to critique the 
capitalist order. Ampelmann’s bulbous shape, formerly criticized as being antiquated, 
now became a way to set him apart from the western figure, playing the westerners own 
‘slimness’ and ‘athleticism’ against it. Easterners also began to adopt western economic 
rationale at this point. They argued that since the lights were already up, it made no sense 
to tear them down and that the Ampelmann lights did not cost any more to produce than 
those with the western figure.
168
 Removing Ampelmann now became a sign of 
carelessness and inefficiency, destroying a character which was both more practical and 
more enjoyable than his bland western rival. 
      This practicality and likability were linked to the various origin stories of Ampelmann 
and, especially, his hat. By some accounts, the hat was introduced through the genius of 
his creator, Karl Peglau, who placed the hat on Ampelmann’s head in order to help him 
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give off more light and to make him more appealing to children.
169
 Other origin stories 
say that the hat was jokingly added by Peglau’s secretary and kept in order to introduce a 
bit of humour into everyday life.
170
 Speaking of the decision years later, Peglau’s wife, 
Hildegard Peglau, recalled her version: “Hair parted to the side? Not anti-fascist enough! 
Curly hair? Too southern! The solution smiled at us from state television on a summer’s 
day: the sun was shining, it was quite hot, and Erich Honecker was wearing a straw 
hat.”
171
 One writer commented on the practicality of this hat, saying that it: “blocks the 
sun in the summer and keeps his [Ampelmann’s] head warm in the winter.”
172
 Regardless 
of how Ampelmann’s hat was introduced, these stories represent the complimentary 
images of the GDR being constructed through Ampelmann: a place of practicality and 
comforting warmness but also, more simply, a place where not everything was bad.  
      The connection to everyday life was also significant here. Instead of being part of the 
mechanism of the state or the Stasi, Ampelmann was a figure of the people, untouched by 
the GDR’s corruption. As such, he quickly became a ‘typical Ossi (Easterner)’. One 
article idealized Ampelmann saying that: “[…] because there was no joy in grey, socialist 
daily life, they [easterners] greeted the small, green Ampelmann everyday[…] and 
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because he is not gone, the easterners still greet him every day, their Ampelmann.”
173
 The 
connection to uncorrupted everyday life in the GDR helps to explain the appeal of 
Ampelmann over other aspects of GDR culture; he represents a symbol of the GDR 
which was both untouched by the state and touched all residents equally. Ampelmann’s 
popularity is not surprising given his role in the GDR as an educational instrument which 
entered into the everyday lives of easterners through classrooms and television as 
examined in the previous chapter. 
      Efforts to save Ampelmann were not, however, uniformly successful. Indeed, the 
latter half of the 1990s was a mixed bag for Ampelmann. Although popular efforts had 
now massed in favour of the figure, supported by government officials, he was not saved 
just yet. In 1996, an article lamented the disappearance of Ampelmann but suggested that 
he would not go away: “…Ampelmann is disappearing from the streets to reappear in 
products such as postcards.”
174
 This suggests that the commodification of Ampelmann 
may well have been the best method to preserve him, if governments continued to prove 
unwilling to step up. “Nothing is to come from tolerance and diversity,” asserted another 
writer in response to the continued replacement of Ampelmann lights when the Berlin 
city government chose a unified, western streetscape in 1997.
175
 This was not to last, 
however, and just three days after the announcement on 19 February detailing 
Ampelmann’s replacement the city changed its mind. In defense of the earlier decision, 
transportation senator Jürgen Klemann declared that “our sources did not at first inform 
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us of the popularity of the eastern figure.”
176
 Significant damage had already been done, 
however, and by the time the city chose to preserve Ampelmann, just 600 of his lights 
remained. Thuringia followed suit in August 1997 when the city of Erfurt, along with the 
majority of the state, decided to save Ampelmann.
177
 Significant progress was made on a 
wider scale in the same year when the Federal Government declared that the western 
figure was only mandatory on federal roads; municipalities could do as they pleased.
178
 
Ampelmann’s popularity continued to surge during this time and demands for designer 
lamps fashioned from Ampelmann lights soared. The factory which produced the 
Ampelmann traffic lights (which were used in the making of the lamps), Roßberg 
GmbH,
179
 was inundated with requests.  Of the 5000 lights it produced in 1998, only 




Bridging Past and Present 
      More than just representing a physical link to the past, however, Ampelmann also 
grew into an ideological link with the GDR as east Germans selected ideals and 
temporally transposed them into the present. This involved a particular, very selective 
recalculation of the socialist past. Ampelmann’s ideological connection began with his 
transformation into a figure of socialism (as east Germans remembered it) one writer 
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went so far as to call him a “socialist light comrade.”
181
 Ampelmann’s version of 
socialism was generally negatively defined as being against the genderless, faceless, 
capitalist image represented by the western traffic light figure. A group of Berlin theatre-
goers agreed, staging a demonstration outside of a theatre in order to “act out against 
people who do not think about this [the replacing of eastern traffic lights],” referring to 
Ampelmann as representative of “class struggle.” They insisted that their figure was a 
“dynamic worker” in contrast to his western colleague.
182
  
      Although Ampelmann’s socialist makeover began with the popular efforts to save 
him in the mid-1990s, this process rapidly gained momentum at the beginning of the new 
millennium. The aspects of this socialism, as east Germans perceived it, which 
Ampelmann came to represent were varied. The figure embodied those parts of the GDR 
that could evoke either joy or terror, or both. The most prominent ideal Ampelmann 
represented was the desire for control as well as for safety and simplicity. Ampelmann 
represented control in a direct way given his regulation of traffic flow, providing people 
with the safety introduced by organized traffic patterns.  
      This control, however, more than providing just physical security, also provided 
social security. East Germans borrowed these ideals from the collective traffic safety 
culture which Ampelmann helped to form in the GDR. In Berlin, for example, a writer 
for Der Tagesspiegel claimed that Ampelmann forged a sense of Berliner identity. All 
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people, regardless of race, class or status must wait for the red man, providing a sense of 
order in the craziness of the new world of busy supermarkets, banks, and capitalism.
183
 
Ampelmann also “taught this to new Berliners who stubbornly disobey the red man and 
run into the street while more seasoned, wiser Berliners wait.”
184
 A journalist from 
London had such an experience, noting: 
I started to ignore them [the traffic lights] a bit and with my impatient London 
pedestrian skills, began hopping across the street if there was no traffic coming even 
when the man was red. It’s got me into hot water, though. 
I had a fiery telling off from a middle-aged woman outside Kino International a few 
weeks back. I shrugged, pretended I couldn’t understand and secretly felt it was quite 




Ampelmann also preserved collectivist ideals from the GDR. In response to the 
commercialization of the figure, one author argued that Ampelmann ought not to belong 
to anyone “but rather to the East German people as a whole…he [Ampelmann] should 
not be a commodity but something owned by the eastern community.”
186
 In this way, 
Ampelmann also served as a means through which selected aspects of the GDR were 
recreated in order to form a distinctive eastern community. In the absence of the GDR, 
the ideals transposed through Ampelmann helped easterners to cope with the loss of their 
former ways of life and the strong sense of community they felt during the GDR period, 
reviving a sense of collective responsibility born in their former state. 
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      Re-establishing a sense of collective responsibility went hand in hand with the desire 
to reintroduce Ampelmann as a tool for traffic safety education. High accident rates and 
the desire for a return to the safety and security of the GDR fueled this.  The director of 
Ampelmann’s television show in the GDR described this sentiment, writing in 1997, that:  
It’s too bad that the two traffic figures no longer play a role as living figures…the 
figures from the traffic lights are excellently suited to teaching pre-school children 
about traffic safety. This is more important than ever. A look at the accident rates 




In this way, East Germans began the transposition of their Ampel-ideals through their 
figure by looking back to the role Ampelmann played in the GDR and wishing for its 
return. 
      Easterners brought these dreams into action as Ampelmann emerged once again as a 
tool for traffic safety education. Reviving the relationship between Ampelmann and the 
police, Hans Grothe, a ‘singing policeman’ who instructed school children on traffic 
safety, used Ampelmann puppets (named “stop” and “go”) as he sang songs and quizzed 
children about traffic safety in 1997 in Wittenberg.
188
 Dessau police also reinforced the 
connection between Ampelmann and education, offering Ampelmann face painting 
during an event at a local school.
189
 The Berlin city government participated as well, 
engaging in a campaign where local street cleaners distributed 12,000 orange 
Ampelmann-shaped reflectors to children across the city under the slogan, “We kehr for 
kids” (kehr here is a play on words, sounding like the English word “care.” In German, 
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Verkehr means traffic or transportation).
190
 The long wait in between the red and green 
Ampelmännchen was also an area of concern, with one school official in Berlin saying 
about the lights that: “There is a school close by. We don’t want the kids to expect a long 
wait,” thus highlighting the revived link between the traffic light figure and safety 
concerns.
191
 By reinstating their traffic safety rituals, easterners recreated the link 
between Ampelmann and childhood born in the GDR. 
      Indeed, this link to childhood was one of the key aspects of memory embodied in 
Ampelmann, forging a base upon which Ampelmann’s popularity could build; a GDR-
centred community could be formed, and a new generation of easterners could be brought 
into it. Easterners attempted to pass on knowledge of the GDR, often very selectively, to 
future generations. A survey of 18-year-olds from Berlin in 2008 revealed that although 
they only covered the GDR briefly in class and that their parents had told them only a bit 





 Grade youth from Berlin repeated this, proposing a concrete plinth 
with the eastern and western traffic light figures on top when given an assignment to 
design a monument for German unity.
193
 Children and the elderly also supported 
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Ampelmann, aiding in his preservation.
194
 A sporting program aimed at supporting 
disadvantaged children further reinforced this link by putting Ampelmann on their soccer 
uniforms.
195
 The GDR which passed on through this memory was thus not just one of 
safety but also simplicity and childhood innocence. 
      Karl Peglau, the man who invented Ampelmann in 1961, embodied this innocence. 
From the time of Ampelmann’s revival until the inventor’s death in 2009, Peglau was 
frequently mentioned across the country, attaining fame as a result of his compassionate 
and warm-hearted image. Drawing a connection between Peglau and average easterners, 
one author mentioned the former’s brilliance before stating that “after unification he 
[Peglau] became unemployed.”
196
 Peglau, like all easterners, suffered from the ills of 
capitalism in the Berlin Republic. 
      Reporters frequently sought out the East German inventor to comment on the birth 
and post-Wall popularity of his traffic light figure, reinforcing his altruistic persona. 
Peglau’s wife perpetuated this narrative: “My Husband was certain that pedestrians 
would only follow a traffic symbol that they liked and understood.” Peglau wanted 
Ampelmann to “be person-like and give off a strong signal” in order to help pedestrians 
cross safely.
197
 “Peglau even named his figures!” one publication explained, “The red one 
he called Stoppi while the green one was Galoppo.” This augmented both the “cute” and 
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“human” image of Peglau’s creation and his own sympathetic nature.
198
 Going to the 
source, Berliner Zeitung turned to Peglau in 2007, asking him to explain the unexpected 
success of Ampelmann:  
Peglau gives three reasons for the Ampelmann cult: the first is that the figure emits a 
warm glow, which people feel attracted to. The second is the attempts to remove the 




In this way, Karl Peglau was a significant source for the Ampel-curious, reinforcing his 
status as a caring, compassionate and insightful easterner who was quite aware of and 
actively involved in the post-Wall career of his beloved Ampelmann. 
      While most articles went out of their way to draw attention to Peglau’s dual status as 
an Engineer and Transportation Psychologist, they also drew attention to Peglau as ‘Vater 
Ampelmann’, Father Ampelmann, who diligently watched over his ‘son’.
200
 In a court 
case over who would have the rights to market Ampelmann (which will be explored in 
more detail in the following chapter), Peglau was expressed contempt for one claimant, 
Joachim Roßberg, who marketed Ampelmann-branded liquor. Peglau was vehement in 
his insistence that the good, likable Ampelmann, representing traffic safety, should not be 
mixed with alcohol.
201
 He continued, saying after the case was settled that he hoped 
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Ampelmann could return to his “peaceful ambassadorship.”
202
  In the period before his 
death, Peglau began to develop even grander plans for his creation, designing 
“Ampelland” – a “mini-Disneyland with restaurants, play areas and traffic safety 
education for children.”
203
 At the same time, he proposed the creation of an Ampelmann 
foundation which would fund traffic safety education for children across the country.  
      Peglau’s image became even more idealized after his death in 2009. Articles 
describing his life highlighted not only his genius and altruism in bringing Ampelmann 
into the world, but also talked about his humility and dedication. One article stated that 
Peglau frequently visited the Ampelmann souvenir stores run by Markus Heckhausen, 
consulting on new products but also keeping a list of all the employees who worked 
there, so that he could remember their names.
204
 Speaking to this, Heckhausen said that 
“it was very important for him [Peglau] to have something to work on.”
205
 Indeed, the 
relationship between the creator of Ampelmann and the shop owner was quite close, as 
Peglau became a “father figure” to Heckhausen’s children, often bringing them “pastry or 
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      In addition to his, warm, kind-hearted public image, the media also portrayed Peglau 
as intelligent and forward-thinking. One article went so far as to compare him to Sigmund 
Jähn, the first German in space (from the GDR), saying that these two “represent a part of 
the GDR past which can be seen as progressive, modern, new and good.”
207
 Peglau was 
also a very relatable figure. Another reporter discussed Peglau’s reasons for creating 
Ampelmann, quoting the engineer as saying that in the GDR “there were not specific 
pedestrian traffic lights. The people were guided by the signals for cars and that was what 
brought them into danger.”
208
 More than being just caring and compassionate, Peglau was 
also seen as clever and intuitive. 
     Both Ampelmann and his creator came to represent the innocence, simplicity, and 
goodness lost since the end of the GDR. In response to the ‘craziness’ and alienation 
which capitalism brought, easterners began to imagine an idealized, simple, safe and 
innocent past, reflected in Ampelmann and Peglau. Part of this was an effort to preserve 
the childhood many remembered from the GDR through the conservation of Ampelmann 
and his role in traffic safety education. This also represented a desire to pass on this 
childhood experience, and the lessons learned from it, to the next generation. 
                                                 
206
 Eva Dorothee Schmid, “Aus der Ampel in die Welt, Berliner Zeitung, October 12, 2011. 
http://www.berliner-zeitung.de/panorama/jubilaeum-aus-der-ampel-in-die-welt,10808334,11001480.html 
207
 David Ensikat, “Der halbierte Held,” Der Tagesspiegel, August 26, 2008. 
http://www.tagesspiegel.de/zeitung/der-halbierte-held/1309870.html 
208




      The image of Karl Peglau as Father Ampelmann does, however, have one key 
problem. If Ampelmann has a father, then surely he must have a mother as well. Indeed, 
Ampelmann does have a mother but Anneliese Wegner, Peglau’s secretary often credited 
with Ampelmann’s hat, is almost entirely absent from this discussion.
209
 She did, 
however, play a key role in the creation of Ampelmann and his subsequent popularity, 
sketching the original Ampelmann design (which had fingers!) according to Peglau’s 
instructions, and helping to write The Book of Ampelmann (Das Buch vom 
Ampelmännchen).
210
 One of Wegner’s rare mentions does, however, give her proper 
credit, saying that Peglau “was helped in the creation of Ampelmann by his graphically 
talented secretary Anneliese Wegner.”
211
 In another, Peglau says that “she was a gifted 
illustrator who drew the hat [on Ampelmann] as a gag.”
212
 Nor is this the only case of 
forgotten women in the Ampelmann story. Indeed, one of the most frequent questions 
posed to Peglau in 2001 was why there was no female Ampelmann. Peglau responded, 
saying that “I hadn’t thought of it,” quickly pointing out, however, “this is not a rejection 
of women – I love women.”
213
 
       As it turns out though, there is a female variant of Ampelmann. Created by graphic 
designer Hans-Jürgen Ellenberger in 1995, Ampelfrau quickly became a symbol of the 
aspects of gender equality lost with the collapse of the GDR.
 214
 This figure was first 
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 Frau, in German, means woman. Thus Ampelfrau is ‚traffic light woman‘ 
60 
 
introduced as a traffic light in the city of Zwickau in Saxony in 2004, throughout Saxony 
in 2005 and in Brandenburg in 2012.
215
 Easterners applauded the introduction of this 
figure, pointing out that her larger silhouette allowed her to give off even more light than 
Ampelmann.
216
 “A new traffic light has been installed in Zwickau,” one paper declared 
on the introduction of Germany’s first Ampelfrau light, “but not the manly one who has 
become famous across the country.”
217
 The practicality of the figure, much like that of 
Ampelmann, was the chief reason for her debut. Zwickau’s press officer anticipated 
Ampelfrau’s pragmatism, saying that “we will watch how the light is received for a 
quarter of a year” before regretting that “the economic situation would not allow us to 
replace all the lights.” Instead, only broken lights, once replaced, were to have the new 
symbol. Ampelfrau’s gender came as a secondary concern as the speaker continued: “if 
the female light receives even more attention that can only be a good thing.”
218
 On the 
same occasion another paper reflected similar values, saying: “the East German 
Ampelmann doesn’t have to regulate the streets alone anymore; the Zwickauers have 
given him an Ampelfrau!”
219
 Concerns over equality came to the fore upon the 
introduction of Ampelfrau in the Brandenburg town of Fürstenwalde, a place which was 
intended to serve as a model community for gender equality.
220
 The equality officer for 
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this town, Anne-Gret Trilling, proudly proclaimed that many schoolchildren walked by 
the first Ampelfrau light in the state.  She claimed that now the students “will be able to 
see equality in action.”
221
 Pragmatic considerations were also used to defend the female 
figure, as Trilling pointed out that the cost of Ampelfrau lights was the same as 
Ampelmann ones and that Ampelfrau had: “In relation to Ampelmann a larger light 
surface due to her skirt and pigtails.”
222
  
      The ideal of gender equality as embodied in Ampelfrau also proved exceedingly 
popular. In response to the spread of Ampelfrau in 2004, one Berlin state senator 
summarized this ideal, saying that “Ampelfrau is a great idea. Go, stay, go, stay, why 
should only men have a say?”
223
 A member of the post-socialist Linke Party agreed with 
this, arguing that: “Our conception of gender roles and what is typically male or female is 
strongly reinforced through public images,” thus expressing his belief that Ampelfrau 
would progress women’s status. Berliner Kurier, a Berlin periodical, was so elated with 
the introduction of Ampelfrau into the city that the paper even gave out Ampelfrau T-
Shirts to the first people to visit its office.
224
  
      Although she was not popularized (or even created) until well after her male 
equivalent, Ampelfrau stood for an aspect of the GDR which many people missed. In the 
GDR, women’s employment was 78.1%. Single motherhood was also widely accepted 
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and motherhood in general was supported by child care services.
225
 Ampelfrau appeared 
here as a woman in the working world, infused with GDR ideals, earning her place 
amongst men on her own terms, supported and encouraged by state policies. 
      Within the larger spectrum of gender critique, however, Ampelfrau appears 
problematic. First, this critique is based on a comparison between the ‘male’ Ampelmann 
figure and the “genderless” western figure. Second, Ampelfrau has also been criticized as 
representing more repressive gender roles than those insisting on her as an agent of 
equality suggest. These critiques point out that although Ampelfrau is called a woman, 
she resembles a girl and that her pigtails and long skirt point to more traditional gender 
roles.
226
 One paper joked about her name (although it was clearly well aware of the 
common name Ampelfrau): “If it’s called Ampelmännchen, then should we call it 
Ampelweibchen (literally Ampelfemale)? Ampelfrauchen (Ampelwoman)? 
Ampelmädchen (Ampelgirl)?” The diminutive ‘chen’ here can also be read as 
derogatory.
227
 Another publication stated this more bluntly, declaring that Ampelfrau has 
“nothing to do with the theme of equality.”
228
 The public image of Ampelmann and 
Ampelfrau shows this as well, with Ampelmann giving his name to the chain of stores as 
well as being featured more prominently in advertising. Karl Peglau himself drew a 
peculiar distinction between the roles of the two figures, saying that: “I am of the opinion 
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that traffic markings should stay uniform. An Ampelfrau on products does not mean that 
she should also be in transportation.”
229
 In this way, Peglau did, apparently, think about 
women and traffic lights together, although the lines that he drew between market success 
and practical applicability remained quite gendered. As such, the gendered aspect of 
Ampelmann is problematic. On one hand, it praises the gendered aspects of Ampelmann 
and Ampelfrau, suggesting that these stand against both ‘genderless’ capitalism and 
unequal gender roles. On the other, these figures can be seen to represent gender roles 
which are both traditional and unequal.  
      This gap may seem irreconcilable. Ampelfrau, cannot, it seems, be both a figure of 
hard working equality and feminine domesticity. Not by western logic at least. But 
Ampelfrau is not a western figure; rather the ideals she represents come from the GDR. 
In this understanding, Ampelfrau fits into the dual image of women propagated in the 
GDR. This image told women to be both workers and mothers, insisting that work was 
part of female liberation and equality but that they still had an integral reproductive 
role.
230
 To support this, the state supplied women with the health care and child services 
necessary to balance these two roles. The inequalities and unfairness of this double 
burden become clear when compared to the male role, which was to work but not much 
else. Indeed, the East German state never specifically defined the role of men in East 
German families.
231
 Ampelmann, as it turns out, reflects parts of this role through the 
vagueness of his ‘masculinity’. Indeed, this is never defined except in contrast to the 
‘genderless’ western figure. Ampelmann’s relation to gender replicates, whether 
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consciously or not, GDR-era patterns of thought. Just as notions of childhood embodied 
in Ampelmann help to forge a sense of eastern community imbued with GDR values, so 
too does the gendered nature of Ampelmann and Ampelfrau. Ampelmann and 
Ampelfrau’s gender roles are also used to suggest GDR ideals which can benefit modern 
society: greater gender equality and equality of opportunity for women. These idealizes 
gender roles depart, however, from notions of childhood in that they are heavily centred 
in the ambiguous, vaguely defined, and frequently unequal gender roles prevalent in the 
GDR. 
Conclusion: Ampelmann, Eingaben and Politics 
      As is natural across any diverse, widely spread community and as is indicated by the 
individuals critiquing the gendered nature of Ampelfrau, Ampelmann is not a universally 
or uniformly accepted centre of GDR memory. Indeed, as this paper has already stressed 
in the introduction, Ampelmann is often seen as a symbol of everything wrong with the 
memory of the GDR. Barbara Thalheim, a singer from the GDR, summarized this view, 
saying that there were many GDRs. On one extreme is the GDR of the Stasi, on the other 
is one with “jumping Ampelmanns who guide old men with hats across the street.”
232
 For 
her, the GDR lays somewhere in-between; she has good memories, certainly, but she also 
had encounters with the Stasi and their Inofficial Mitarbeiter (Unofficial Collaborators, or 
IMs).
233
 The director of the Stasi archives even warned against the danger of 
Ampelmann, suggesting that it causes people to focus too narrowly on the GDR while 
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ignoring the repressive nature of the state.
234
 Ampelmann is thus not a universal symbol 
for the good aspects of the GDR. 
      This is a valuable point; there are, of course, several aspects of the GDR which 
Ampelmann does not deal with or discuss.  An Ampelmann T-shirt, now a rather 
mundane article of clothing, for example, would have been, in the words of one attendee 
of a conference dedicated to the legacy of the GDR, an “unthinkable” item of clothing for 
a youth to wear in the GDR, given its connection to the state.
235
 Whether an Ampelmann 
or Erich Honecker T-shirt, said one interviewee in a 2011 poll: “even playful contact with 
GDR history is very difficult for the victims of the SED regime.”
236
 It is important not to 
stretch this line of reasoning too far, however. There is, of course, plenty of room for 
pluralities across the landscape of German memory. Although Ampelmann provides a 
divergent memory from, for example, that of the dictatorship narrative, the existence of 
one does not preclude the other. 
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      Indeed, Ampelmann serves as a modern form of the Eingaben which were a crucial 
aspect of the GDR’s “participatory dictatorship.”
237
 In the GDR, Eingaben (a word 
without a direct English equivalent; it is usually translated as “petition” although this is 
not quite accurate as Eingaben do not necessary involve multiple signatories) functioned 
as a line of communication between the state and society. Eingaben themselves were sort 
of ‘customer complaints’ pointing out flaws within the socialist system and suggesting 
improvements which could be made. These suggestions could include anything from 
complaining about the quality of toasters and clothing to requesting road work.
238
 
Ampelmann functions in a similar manner; he represents a critique of western society 
while not aiming to undermine it. Instead, Ampelmann is used as an Eingabe from many 
easterners written to the modern German state. Ampelmann thus serves as a way for 
easterners to express their dislike of the disorderly, alienating, ‘genderless’, often 
exploitative nature of western society, suggesting an alternative informed by GDR-
centred values, patterns of thought and ideals. Furthermore, Ampelmann helps to 
strengthen communal ties amongst easterners; he gives them a way to define and 
understand the significance of their past and he offers a means through which this 
significance can make a contribution to the modern German state. 
     As a result, Ampelmann has become a political figure. This reality stands in contrast 
to his image as presented by Karl Peglau and others. In response to the question, “Did 
you think Ampelmann would get so old, even surviving the state for which he was 
made?” Peglau responded: “Absolutely: Ampelmann is a non-political figure of the 
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 An East German author agreed with this sentiment, dismissing Ostalgie and 
Ampelmann in his work and saying that he “instead wishes to focus on politics.”
240
 But 
Ampelmann is political. A group of Prenzlauer Berg residents, for example, used 
Ampelmann in order to protest restaurants whose tables were cluttering up sidewalks. To 
do this, these residents painted green Ampelmänner on sidewalks used by the violators, 
sending a message that this ought to be a clear, public place.
241
 A group of protesting 
workers in Schwerin used similar symbolism during their attempt to obtain pay equal to 
that of their western counterparts. To this end, a combination of police officers and 
workers from the Education and Science Union held signs with Ampelmann demanding 
that they “keep pace with” other workers.
242
 In these ways, the socialist values which 
easterners see in Ampelmann are occasionally mobilized more directly. By defending 
public space from private intrusion and searching for wage equality, easterners are not 
just imagining their ideals in their traffic light figure but making real attempts to achieve 
them. 
      Often, however, politicians use Ampelmann as merely another empty gesture for 
political gain. One article questioned Senator Jürgen Klemann’s motives in preserving 
Ampelmann on Berlin streets in 1997, speculating: “perhaps he is an opponent of euro-
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centrism or perhaps he was concerned about votes in the east.”
243
 Less ambiguously, 
Ampelmann was used by the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS, the successor to the 
East German SED) in a 1998 Bundestag election campaign which pitted them against the 
Social Democratic Party (SPD).
244
 The PDS used Ampelmann-adorned T-Shirts and 
badges in an attempt to overcome a 5% gap in electoral polls by encouraging 
contributions.  
      Outside of electoral struggles, Ampelmann’s image has become a symbol commonly 
evoked throughout the political system. One Berlin senator, for example, was seen 
wearing a green Ampelmann on his lapel; a member of the Brandenburg SPD hung an 
Ampelmann poster in his office, in order to show his mastery of East German things. 
Ampelmann ties, Christmas lights, wrapping paper, and shirts have also made 
appearances in the halls of German political power. These gestures seem to have little 
meaning beyond a recognition that Ampelmann comes from East Germany, is popular 
and safely ambiguous. Indeed, Ampelmann has become such a well-recognized figure in 
German politics that his absence (in favour of pictures of Willy Brandt and Helmut 
Schmidt) from the office of Chancellor Angela Merkel was noted by Berliner Zeitung. 
Neues Deutschland summed up the politicization of Ampelmann most succinctly, saying 
of the figure’s use by a right-wing party in an electoral campaign that “there is only 
badness in this, we have a name for this type of people today; copycats.”
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      The growing popularity of Ampelmann beginning around 1996 has revolved around 
the absence of the GDR and the desire to preserve the ideals, community, and identity of 
those with this shared past. Creating a usable East German past has involved careful 
selection as those ideals which are seen as absent in, but valuable to, contemporary 
Germany are remembered and, to some degree, resurrected. East German 
memorialization through Ampelmann expanded with the beginning of the new 
millennium as the distance from the GDR became greater, and thus more pressing, and as 
the image of the formerly idealized west began to conform more to reality. Ampelmann 
has come to represent the socialism, control, order, simplicity, and innocence easterners 
long for. Ampelmann has also become a way through which GDR ideals can be recreated 
through notions of childhood and gender and passed on to the next generation. This 
narrative has its heroes -- Karl Peglau, Jörg Davids and Markus Heckhausen -- as well as 
its villains: the western traffic light figure and the values it represents. Ampelmann-
centred memory also serves as an unwritten Eingabe, a letter of complaint requesting 
changes to, but not a complete rejection of, the systems currently in place. 
      Ampelmann has not, however, been memorialized in a vacuum. Instead, the figure 
has been shaped, in part, by the west, its values, and its consumerism - an inevitable 
process given the fact that Ampelmann has now graced reunified streets longer than East 
German ones. This has led to the expansive commercialization of Ampelmann as a brand 
and an image adorning everything from t-shirts to flip flops, from pasta to dog collars.
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Even in the east, Ampelmann frequently appears in advertisements.
247
 This is often seen 
as an irreconcilable contradiction; the commodification of the eastern past is frequently 
viewed as a tool of exploitation which serves to re-exoticize the east, highlighting its 
continuing backwardness and otherness.
248
 Indeed, this interpretation has a great deal of 
logic behind it; the socialism of the GDR cannot possibly be compatible with the 
neoliberalism of the twenty-first century. 
      Yet oddly enough, in Ampelmann, these are simply two sides of the same coin. The 
next chapter will examine how Ampelmann has been used as a means through which not 
only a usable past, but also a usable present have been formed. It will argue that 
easterners have not been ignorant and passive in the commodification of their past, but 
rather that they are among its most active supporters. The process through which this is 
achieved bears many similarities to the commemoration of the GDR through 
Ampelmann. It is in this way that easterners can continue to form and maintain their 
identity in the face of their new reality, even adopting it to suit their own perception of 
how the world ought to be. 
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Chapter 3: Crossing the West: Ampelmann, the West, and the Creation of a Usable 
Present 
       Cameras rolled and journalists shoved their microphones through the air as people 
began to file into the largest room of the state courthouse in Leipzig, a room usually 
reserved for murder cases. The accused in this June 2005 case, Joachim Roßberg from 
Saxony, producer of the Ampelmann lights in the GDR and the owner of an online store 
where Ampelmann t-shirts, coffee mugs, and schnapps were available for purchase, 
managed to slide into the room unimpeded.
249
 The other claimant and owner of the 
massively successful Ampelmann souvenir stores, Ampelmann GmbH, Markus 
Heckhausen, from the western city of Tübingen, was not quite so lucky. Stopped by a 
camera crew, he was asked about his stake in the fate of the small figure whose image 
could be seen kicking a soccer ball on the bag slung over his shoulder. It seemed, then, 
like an all too frequently repeated story; the successful westerner, carrying the standard of 
capitalism, and the poor easterner, set to have his life’s work taken away. This imagery 
was not lost on the crowd either; one commentator said the events were “like a scene 
from the Cold War.”
250
 
      This idea, however appealing a narrative it may seem, does not, however, align with 
reality. Indeed, the two claimants had once been allies working together on the Save the 
Ampelmännchen Committee and both contributed articles to the Committee’s 
publication: Das Buch vom Ampelmännchen.
251
 Their positions in the case, too, seem to 
be reversed. This was not, as one article pointed out, “a story of a rich westerner and a 
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 Instead, when Heckhausen first approached Roßberg in 1997 looking 
for glass to make his designer lamps, it was the former who, due to his comparatively 
meagre resources, drove a Trabant while the latter, enriched by his company Zwickauer 
Verkehrstechnik Roßberg GmbH, could afford a Mercedes. Their fortunes had changed 
quite a bit since those early days, however, as Heckhausen had earned 1.6 million Euros 
from his three Berlin stores in 2004, while Roßberg earned approximately 50,000 Euros a 
year from his Ampelmann side business.
253
 Heckhausen had even managed to secure the 
support of Ampelmann’s creator, Karl Peglau, who sat in the courtroom as an observer.
254
 
Upon first meeting Heckhausen in 1997, Peglau was skeptical about westerners but 
changed his mind after just one coffee, as Heckhausen would later attest: “He [Peglau] 
found it quite strange that I wanted to use his transportation technology as a design for 
products… [but] once he realized that I didn’t want to sell off his little guy, he was 
excited.”
255
 Following this meeting, Peglau agreed, in 1997, to grant Heckhausen the 
rights to the figure. In exchange Heckhausen paid the inventor royalties. Peglau later 
became a consultant and friend to the shop owner.
256
 
      The court case made news across the country and in the early stages many continued 
to voice their support for Roßberg. Heckhausen was dismissed as a “Wessi” (a derogatory 
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term for a westerner), and referred to as Roßberg’s enemy.
257
 This continued a trend 
begun by earlier publications which made fun of Heckhausen, the ludicrous prices of his 
lamps (200 Marks), and their English slogans “Don’t stop me now” and “keep on 
walking.” Berliner Zeitung jokingly suggested that one could read a newspaper in the 
bathroom with the help of these expensive toys.
258
 Others pointed out that the direction of 
the green Ampelmann on most of Heckhausen’s products was wrong, pointing right 
instead of left. They also drew attention to Roßberg’s early attempts to negotiate a 
settlement with the westerner, quoting the factory owner who stated that: “I will see 
which rights I can do without” before offering to sell his excess rights.
259
 Roßberg’s 
authenticity was highlighted as people began referring to him as the “original 
manufacturer of the Ampelmann,” underscoring his passion and drive in maintaining the 
rights to the traffic figure he had worked with for so long.
260
 Roßberg seemed, then, to 
have a good shot at securing the rights to his hat-wearing business partner. 
      Roßberg did little, however, to foster these sympathies. He handed out business cards 
claiming that his factory was the “cradle of the East German Ampelmännchen”
261
 and 
even went so far as to claim that he was the creator of the traffic light man. If this did not 
earn Peglau’s disapproval, Roßberg’s marketing of Ampelmann schnapps certainly did. 
Peglau was adamant that his figure, associated with friendliness, children, and traffic 
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safety, ought not to be connected with alcohol.
262
 Peglau’s disapproval constituted a 
major factor in the decline of Roßberg’s support since Peglau’s grandfatherly image was 
more durable than the factory owner’s popularity. 
      The case dragged on for another two years, moving from Leipzig to Dresden as 
Heckhausen argued that Roßberg was not using the rights granted to him by the Munich 
patent office in 1997 either correctly or continuously (thus violating the conditions under 
which the rights were granted).
263
 Roßberg, with increasing desperation, even attempted 
to dispute that the rights to Ampelmann, did not belong to him but rather to his son (who 
would have been nine at the time he received them) who shared his name.
264
 Although it 
delayed proceedings, this move proved disastrous for Roßberg who lost whatever public 
sympathy he had managed to hold onto. After the dust settled and substantial legal fees 
had been incurred the verdict was finally determined; Heckhausen, the western capitalist, 
was successful, securing the rights to the vast majority of Ampelmann products from 
clothing to office accessories to beer while Roßberg clung to his rights to Ampelmann 
schnapps, his most profitable product (among a few others).
265
 
      While Peglau’s support for Heckhausen’s use and expansion of the Ampelmann 
image did indeed play a significant role in the westerner’s victory in the court case, it 
does not explain the adoration the westerner obtained among easterners and the 
population at large, in contrast to the less popular Roßberg. Papers across the country and 
                                                 
262
 Sebastian Leber, “Grüne Welle,” Der Tagesspiegel, June 17, 2006. 
http://www.tagesspiegel.de/weltspiegel/gruene-welle/721520.html 
263
 Anemi Wick, “Wem gehört das Ampelmännchen,” Die Welt, June 08, 2005. http://www.welt.de/print-
welt/article675148/Wem-gehoert-der-Ampelmann.html 
264








particularly in the east characterized Heckhausen as a shepherd, praising the westerner’s 
entrepreneurial spirit, ingenuity and concern for eastern values.
266
 Indeed throughout the 
case several papers referred to Heckhausen not as a Tübinger or a westerner but rather as 
a Berliner or a Wahl-Berliner, a Berliner by choice.
267
 Heckhausen contributed to this 
idea as well, as one paper commented that he was “avoiding any allusion to an east-west 
conflict.”
268
 Another paper agreed, arguing that his Ampelmann shops in Berlin were “in 
truth not a western company at all,” noting that most of their 30 employees came from the 
east and they were frequented equally by shoppers from the east and west.
269
 Others 
focused on the variety of products available at the Berlin stores, proclaiming that there 
were “about 600 products” while drawing attention to their popularity and the 2.4 million 
Euros his stores took in in 2005, up significantly from the previous year.
270
 One judge, 
when comparing Roßberg and Heckhausen sided with the latter, stating that there were 
“worlds between the activity of the two.”
271
 His shops’ ethics were another popular topic. 
After his victory one reporter excitedly described how Heckhausen could expand his 
production and product lines, most of which would be based in the east. This included 
plastics in Thuringia, fruit gummies in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and baby clothes in 
Saxony.
272
 Even the inverted direction of the green figure on most of his products was 
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      This praise was not limited, however, to the context of the court case itself. Before 
and after the verdict individuals on both sides received Heckhausen warmly. Early in 
1997 one article painted Heckhausen and his quest to assemble lamps out of discarded 
Ampelmann lights in almost mystical terms, calling him a “saviour” and claiming that 
“the Ostalgic must no longer fumble around in the dark now that he is around, their hopes 
glow anew as he rises up out of the ruins.”
274
 This image shows not only Heckhausen’s 
popularity but also his acceptance by easterners: he might come from the west but he 
could still “rise up out of the ruins,” an allusion to the national anthem of the GDR, 
“Auferstehen aus Ruinen” or “Risen from Ruins.” Support for the shop owner continued 
to grow over the following years as Heckhausen merged eastern values with his 
Ampelmann stores while preserving the idealized image of the figure. In 2003, for 
example, Heckhausen showed his support for eastern concerns over traffic safety by 
having a sale at his stores where shoppers could buy a back-to-school package 
containing, among other things, an Ampelmann bike flag and a reflector which could be 
attached to either a bike or backpack. These were sold for “9.90 Euros instead of 
17.30.”
275
 In another situation, Heckhausen was pitted against the Berlin zoning 
authorities who aimed to remove an illuminated Ampelmann sign he had hung outside of 
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his Prenzlauer Berg apartment. The media immediately began portraying Heckhausen as 
a victim, saying that “the owner of the building and the neighbours were excited” when 
Heckhausen put the sign up in 1998.
276
 One of his neighbours spoke out in his favour 
saying that “The sign is great, the children adore it. The authorities should leave the 
decision to those who see it every day!”
277
 Heckhausen’s status as a family man also 
aligned him with the idea of an innocent, caring Ampelmann. One paper pointed out that 
a new line of Ampelmann baby clothes was “inspired by his wife and three children; 
Theresa, Helena and Rosalie.”
278
 Following Karl Peglau’s death in 2009, Peglau’s widow 
warmly praised the westerner as well, arguing that: “Without Heckhausen and his 
business the Ampelmann would not have survived.” Heckhausen, his stores, and his 
values, despite their western origins, were made to fit with the image of Ampelmann, 
showing how westernness did not necessarily preclude the values of safety, security, 
family, innocence, and fun embodied in the eastern traffic light figure. 
      Indeed, the connection to eastern values was pronounced throughout the branding of 
Ampelmann. The convergence of eastern symbolism and values with selectively 
envisioned elements of western capitalism and modernity through Ampelmann 
refashioned the GDR so easterners could adopt capitalism and western values on their 
own terms. Creating this connection involved not only giving a western business 
permission to represent the eastern traffic light figure, but spread much more widely as 
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easterners actively reconstructed the world around them in order to make their new reality 
of commodification, capitalism, and neoliberalism understandable, manageable, safe, and 
even friendly. The image of a friendly, responsible, respectful capitalism was created not 
because of how these values were reflected in the systems of western governance but 
because of their absence. 
      The rapid transition to a neoliberal society from a socialist one left many easterners 
behind. Even in 1998 many adults in Leipzig, attempting to deal with bleak employment 
opportunities, continued to attend workshops teaching basic interview skills, something 
they would not have needed in the GDR.
279
 Other easterners showed their discontent in 
various ways, participating in anti-capitalist demonstrations, wishing for the Berlin Wall 
to come back or, most commonly, simply by being unhappy.
280
 Their dismal prospects 
conflicted directly with the formerly idealized image of the West and the glories of its 
capitalist system in which many from the GDR had once believed. Reunification, a 
process which was once seen as natural and desirable, now seemed to have imposed an 
alienating, exploitative and thoroughly uncaring world on East Germans.
281
 
      Allowing for westernization and commodification to take place did not hinder 
Ampelmann’s function as a paragon of eastern values and a tool through which this past 
was redefined. Quite the contrary, the adoption of western values allowed for the little 
traffic light man to succeed not only in the new Länder but the old western ones as well. 
As the language used to express the value of Ampelmann changed, and competition with 
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his western comrades became encouraged, the figure fulfilled what many perceived to be 
his destiny: conquering the west. Examining the court case over the rights to market 
Ampelmann, however, reveals that the convergence of east and west goes even further. 
The westernized ideals ascribed to Ampelmann may have, in some small way, furthered 
German unity as Germans on both sides of the former border have learned to understand 
the values of their counterparts in accessible terms. Ampelmann now represents a prism 
through which the present can be understood, improved upon, and made compatible with 
the East German past. 
      The capitalist concept of competition was one of the first western ideals to be 
negotiated through Ampelmann. The attempts by easterners to describe the value of their 
traffic light figure in these terms began unsteadily. As explored in chapter 2, the earliest 
iterations of these arguments focused on the less objective aspects of Ampelmann’s 
superiority, referring to the western traffic light figure as “no-frills” and “static,” 
“genderless” and “generic.”
282
 The western figure’s image stood in contrast to their own 
eastern figure who was “loved not only by children but adults as well,” “green, 
cheery,”
283
 and “guides people happily across the street.”
284
 That “the traffic light man 
greets pedestrians in various forms; with an umbrella, as an explorer with a backpack and 
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       In response to these subjective arguments, westerners constructed narratives of 
progress and modernity which rejected Ampelmann. Speaking of Ampelmann, Der 
Spiegel argued that he had no place in the modern city: “A traffic light today must be able 
to display more than red, green, or yellow. Our dream goal is a modern light system that 
could also regulate buses and trams in order to help solve traffic problems.”
286
 A similar 
argument was put forward by westerners claiming that the new western figure could be 
better integrated into computer systems.
287
 Some even suggested that the western one was 
cheaper to produce, and that unnecessary costs could be avoided by switching to this 
figure across the country so as to maximize production capacity.
288
 Some easterners 
resigned themselves to defeat, agreeing that the replacement of Ampelmann with his 
western counterpart was a modernization which would “get rid of the passé hats and 
shoes of the old man towards a new, more unified man.”
289
 In the early years, then, 
Ampelmann supporters were unable to successfully market their figure in a way 
westerners accustomed to the language of capitalism understood. Westerners legitimized 
the perceived superiority of their traffic light figure by suggesting that it was more 
practical, modern, and economical. 
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      Easterners began to adapt, however, by infusing their arguments more directly with 
the objective language of capitalism. A diagram in Das Buch vom Ampelmännchen 
illustrates just this. Here, the outstretched arms of the red man are compared to various 
other traffic symbols, such as the lights used to regulate trams, as well as signs governing 
the movements of ships and automobiles. In these symbols a horizontal rectangle for 
stopping is a common theme. This is mimicked by the red Ampelmann but not by the 
western figure, who stands stiffly at attention. The green Ampelmännchen is also shown 
in this diagram to have a significantly larger form than his western counterpart, making 
him more immediately recognizable (see appendix 3).
290
 Easterners began to point out 
Ampelmann’s practical benefits particularly for “children and the colourblind” as 
“Ampelmann clearly shows when they can cross the street.”
291
 Karl Peglau himself began 
to accept the idea of capitalist-style competition, stating in 2001 that: “It would be 
wonderful if the federal Ministry for Transportation would form a commission to find out 




            By adopting the language of the west in order to express the value of their eastern 
figure, easterners opened the lines of communication with their countrymen; allowing 
westerners to accept Ampelmann on their own terms and, increasingly, on the subjective 
terms first employed by their eastern neighbours. A significant advancement in the status 
of Ampelmann, particularly in the eyes of the west, came from a 2013 study by Jacobs 
University in Bremen. This study compared the eastern and western traffic light figures 
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by showing participants alternating images of the ‘stop’ and ‘go’ figures, sometimes with 
their appropriate colours and sometimes with these colours reversed. The responses of the 
participants were measured when they pressed a button indicating whether or not they 
should cross. The eastern figure emerged triumphant from this, as individuals responded 
to him not only more rapidly, but much more accurately, particularly when the colours 
were reversed.
293
 The mention of this study in western publications is evidence of the 
eastern Ampelmann’s success when assessed by more empirical capitalist standards. 
      In conjunction with this, Ampelmann proved himself to be a dynamic figure of the 
modern age. This began quite early with the Save the Ampelmännchen Committee which 
gained support rapidly through its presence online. Here, the committee organized its 
efforts, discussed the values of its idol and determined how he could be saved. The 
internet not only gave the committee a more widespread voice but helped earn legitimacy 
and the respect of the western media. One paper listed the goods sold by the committee, 
defending them by saying that: “this movement is trying to be more than a commercial 
gag; 20 percent of the profits go into a savings account. With this, they are financing 
solidarity actions for the hat-wearing man.”
294
 This trend continued along with the 
success of Ampelmann as a commercial entity. Heckhausen himself defended eastern 
products against a critical article in Der Spiegel, saying that: “We want to show that aside 
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from Spreewald pickles there are also young, dynamic products which are often 
overlooked in the current economic situation.”
295
 
       On a pragmatic level, the modernity of Ampelmann shone through when several 
municipalities decided to change from incandescent lighting to LEDs. When the Berlin 
city council was first installing 80 of these lights at the cost of 1.5 million Euros, they 
used this as a vehicle to push Ampelmann further into western Berlin. One official stated 
that: “The money spent on modernization is a good investment as the new light signals 
are lower maintenance.”
296
 Another western municipality outlined how the modern lights 
would reinforce the effectiveness of the figure, declaring that: “The future is even 
brighter because he [Ampelmann] uses more affordable and effective LED lights.”
297
An 
online campaign started by the western newspaper Die Welt used the eastern figure as 
well; in protest over a proposed EU internet tax, the paper established a website which 
people could join to show their dissatisfaction with each member adding a red 
Ampelmann to the site.
298
  
      Ampelmann has even entered into the mobile world. In addition to an official app 
from Ampelmann GmbH, there is also Barcoo, a barcode scanner intended to help 
parents with young children bypass the often deceptive labelling of food products in order 
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to determine if these items are healthy or not.
299
 Foods with an excess of sodium and fat 
receive the foreboding red Ampelmann while only the healthiest products earn the green 
Ampelmann stamp of approval.
300
 Another app, called Theo, aims to help those preparing 
for their driving test, displaying a green Ampelmann when the candidate is ready to 
write.
301
 In this way, Ampelmann has not only entered successfully into the modern 
world but has maintained his core values in doing so. His image highlights the best 
interests of the population, particularly people’s safety and health. 
      Westerners have also begun to agree with their eastern neighbours on the emotional 
value of Ampelmann. One western writer admitted that:  
the easterner [Ampelmann] is not only cuter looking when compared to his colleague 
but he is also better at his task of traffic safety. The western colleague stands thinly, 
with his arms stiffly along his side, while the eastern Ampelmännchen with 
outstretched arms gives off almost twice as much light. The 40 year old 
Ampelmännchen has a socialist character, combining beauty and charm with 
expediency, warmth with diligence.
302
 
 Other Berliners agreed. One shopper described her first encounter with Ampelmann after 
his spread into the famous shopping district, Kufürstendamm (Ku’damm): “When I first 
encountered him, I was disconcerted for a second” “What are you looking for in our 
Ku’damm?” But she has since grown to like him: “He is dynamic and funny – much 
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more likable than our teetering Westman.”
303
 These statements, echoed throughout the 
west, reveal a confluence of ideals those studying Ostalgie seldom examine. Here, the 
narrative of capitalism has evolved to support and serve the eastern Ampelmann, forming 
a bridge which can allow for westerners to appreciate the emotional aspects of the figure, 
even seeing them as practicality of a different sort. A writer for Die Welt summed this up 
most succinctly: “One can instantly see that he is simply better than his old and new 
western competitors.”
304
 Although the relationship between east and west Germans 
remains patently unequal, the convergence of eastern and western language surrounding 
Ampelmann shows that mutual acceptance between the two is possible.     
      His familiar and likable face has even made occasional appearances on the campaign 
trail, proving his ability to function within western systems. A group of students from the 
Hellersdorf district of (formerly East) Berlin used Ampelmann in an effort to get young 
people to vote in an upcoming election. To this end, they created posters bearing the 
figure walking to the local polling station along with the slogan “everyone has their cross 
to carry.”
305
 The creator of the campaign said he wanted to combat election apathy, 
choosing Ampelmann because he is “funny,” and claiming that “the more people who 
vote, the more representative our democracy will be.”
306
 This political use of Ampelmann 
appears positive, showing how easterners are able to use a symbol from their past in order 
to adapt to and engage with the democratic present.  
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      Ampelmann has also, however, been used disingenuously. The neoliberal Free 
Democratic Party (FDP) once infamously used Ampelmann in an election campaign. 130 
posters bearing a blue running Ampelmann (the colour of the FDP), the leader of the 
party, Rexrodt, and a red stopping Ampelmann, proclaimed support for the party.
307
 
People across the country were quick to speak out against this, highlighting the 
contradiction between the socialism of the traffic light figure and the free market 
capitalism of the party.
308
 Heckhausen himself responded to this, calling the use of the 
figure “insolent.”
309
 Later, Ampelmann was declared the “secret winner” of the election 
when the FDP, who abused his symbolism, lost all of their seats.
310
 The exchange 
between east and west through Ampelmann has not always been a smooth, easy, or even 
respectful process. Although the figure can represent an exchange of ideas and an 
integration of lifestyles, his image is also open to abuse. 
       Ampelmann, then, has become an increasingly malleable and open figure in the post-
reunification years. He has become a tool through which the values of capitalism, the 
traumas of a modernizing world, and the desire for understanding can be broken down, 
digested, and given a friendly face. His use as a beacon of friendly, responsible capitalism 
and modernity has not only allowed easterners to adapt to their often desperate situation 
but has also permitted westerners to appreciate and use some aspects of the eastern past. 
More than this, however, with the reforming of Ampelmann into an image compatible 
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with capitalism and modernity, easterners have also given their figure a foothold so that 
he may cross not just streets but the border into western Germany. 
Ampelmann’s Westward March 
      Ampelmann’s westward journey began in a rather unlikely place. In celebration of the 
Day of German Unity, the first western traffic light bearing the eastern Ampelmann 
figure was erected in the city of Überlingen in Baden-Württemberg in 1997.
311
 
Describing the decision years later, the head of the Civil Engineering Department for the 
city proclaimed that “We saw the little guy in our Saxon sister city Bad Schandau and 
found it much more attractive than the western man” adding that “our kids adore it.” 
Indeed by 2004 Ampelmann directed traffic from 3 of the 4 lights in the lakeside city.
312
 
      Despite this early victory, however, Ampelmann’s march into the west was not a 
uniform or easy process, in part due to the federal government taking no official stance 
on the issue, instead permitting municipalities to choose whichever signal they wished. 
Berlin, in particular, was contested ground for Ampel-advocates. Being at once 
Germany’s largest city and capital as well as the spiritual home of Ampelmann, the 
actions decided upon by the Berlin city council often served as a microcosm for the 
course of Ampelmann’s activities. Coinciding with the anti-Ampelmann narratives of 
progress and modernity already examined, the replacement of Ampelmann lights in the 
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city began in 1994 as an effort towards a unified streetscape.
313
 Following this, the Save 
the Ampelmännchen Committee formed in the city in 1997 when the number of 
Ampelmann lights dipped to 500, down from their peak of 1300.
314
 A motion in the next 
year saved the little green man, dictating that when repaired, traffic lights were to bear 
whichever symbol was there before.
315
 The dreams of Ampelmann supporters were not 
yet satisfied, however, and the push continued towards a Berlin unified under the eastern 
traffic light man. These dreams were finally fulfilled in 2004 when Petra Rohland of the 
Senate Committee for City Development declared that: “In the future, all of the 1400 
traffic lights in the western section of the city will bear the eastern Ampelmännchen when 
they are repaired.”
316
 She explained this decision, stating that “we want to present a 
unified image on all Berlin traffic lights. And the eastern figure gives off more light and 
has a better symbolic function, particularly for children.”
317
 Ampelmann achieved this 
victory, then, on terms appropriate to the dual purpose of Ampelmann as both a vehicle of 
eastern values, such as children’s traffic safety, and as a tool to make capitalism more 
manageable by showing how eastern products could be judged and succeed on capitalist 
terms. 
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      After securing a foothold in the western half of Berlin, Ampelmann began his 
campaign to make a mark on the west more broadly. He succeeded perhaps most 
significantly of all in the Hessen city of Kassel, where he debuted in 2007. By 2010, 60 
traffic lights in Kassel shone with the eastern figure, with plans for an Ampelmann 
monopoly by 2022. Bernd Noll of the transportation department supported this, stating 
that due to his “burliness” Ampelmann “gives off a third more light, is easier to see, and 
is also easier to see in bright sunlight.”
318
 Locals agreed: “The resonance among the 
population is greatly positive” said Noll, continuing that when a light is replaced officials 
are told, “that is great, that you are doing this now.” This does not mean, however, that 
Ampelmann will spread outside the city: officials from the neighbouring district declared 
that: “we do not see any reason to make a change [from the western figure].”
319
  
      Ampelfrau claimed another victory in the western campaign of the eastern figures 
when she first appeared in the west in 2008 in Cologne to celebrate international 
women’s day.
320
 Petra Bossinger of the local Christian Democratic Union (CDU) donated 
this light, intending it to replace the “gender neutral character” which stood there before 
and to become a “brilliant little leader for gender equality.” Her skirt and pigtails, 
Bossinger stated, were not intended to represent conservative values but instead aimed to 
remind pedestrians of the movement for women to gain the vote in the 1960s.
321
 
Ampelfrau’s introduction in Hamm, North Rhine-Westphalia, however, was a bit more 
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controversial. When the first Ampelfrau light was installed in the city for the 100
th
 
anniversary of international women’s day, one representative said that Ampelfrau has 
“nothing to do with the theme of equality.”
322
 The mayor thought otherwise, referring to 
the light saying that: “the symbol for the forward motion of women in our city is now 
green.”
323
 Although this was not intended to be a new standard for the city, the light did 
show how westerners accepted eastern traffic light figures for the values they represented, 
even those adapted to fit into a western narrative. 
      Over the next few years, Ampelmann continued to spread across the west to cities 
such as Bremen, Tübingen (the birthplace of Markus Heckhausen), Esslingen, 
Heidelberg, Hanau, Ahrensburg, and even Aachen.
324
 This was not always intentional; in 
Stadtbergen, Bavaria, for example, a company hired to replace a traffic light accidentally 
installed an Ampelmann light. This led to a town-wide debate as the police, state 
government, mayor, and several residents gathered to discuss the fate of the figure. 
Eventually, they decided to keep it, pleasing the mayor who declared that: “I have always 
emphasized that I would like to keep the figure.”
325
 One article later described this as a 
manifest destiny of sorts, saying that: “He [Ampelmann] moves towards the left, almost 
as if his creator knew that he would one day take over the west. Perhaps Peglau was so 
excited with his figure that he sent it away to take over…”
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      The implications of Ampelmann’s acceptance into the western milieu are powerful. 
As an immediately recognizable symbol of the GDR, and a paragon of its ideals, 
Ampelmann and his western march show that east and west are not as oil to water but 
rather capable of intermixing, compromising and coming to mutually beneficial 
agreements, although the terms of these are unequal. This Ampel-ambassador also reveals 
a degree of normalization from both sides of the old divide; Ampelmann is able to 
function simultaneously in the seemingly unnavigable torrent between east and west, 
socialism and capitalism, between genders and between the walls, both tangible and 
intangible, which seek to divide these things. This figure, praised as an embodiment of 
everyday life under the GDR, is now becoming a figure for everyday life in the Berlin 
Republic; regulating the incoherent streams of daily life as easterners and westerners 
alike welcome him into their lives. 
      Despite this surprising success, the western movement of the eastern Ampelmann has 
not been a uniformly positive experience as attitudes held by some in the west have 
collided with this socialist hat-wearer. Aside from merely respecting the technical 
achievements represented in Ampelmann, some westerners have gone one step further, 
either pointing out the western involvement in his post-Wall career or otherwise taking 
credit for some of the more notable Ampel-achievements. The conservative publication 
Die Welt did this when discussing the role of Ampelfrau in post-Wall Germany. By this 
time, Ampelfrau was shining on street corners in Dresden and Zwickau. Engaging in an 
unusual twist of logic, the paper warned that Ampelfrau might give little girls the wrong 
idea that “red signals are just for boys.” Continuing on, the paper took aim at western 
feminists, arguing that: 
92 
 
In the GDR where women’s employment was higher than in the west, no one 
attempted to destroy the patriarchal dominance of the Ampelmann. First they needed 
the West German jargon to infect their heads before anyone could come up with the 
idea for Ampelfrau. Now, she has become a symbolic political tool for legislators 




The paper coloured Ampelfrau as a hollow gesture, an action taken by those unwilling to 
do more to further women’s equality. This is by no means a new critique, but this article 
sets itself apart from others by blaming “West German jargon.” This is a disturbing and 
toxic sort of western arrogance suggesting Ampelfrau’s post-Wall success can be credited 
to westerners as easterners could not possibly have come up with this on their own. This 
article, although more strident than others, is not, however, unique. As already implied by 
the roles of Jörg Davids and Markus Heckhausen, westerners played a key role in the 
popularization and triumph of Ampelmann beginning in the mid 1990s.
328
 While this may 
be portrayed positively – the coming together of east and west to save something of value 
– one article takes this to an extreme, saying about the figure that: “He [Ampelmann] was 
featured along with Sandmännchen on GDR television, entering into the hearts of a 
generation of kids, frequently not only in the GDR but also in the old states. The initiative 
‘Save the Ampelmann’ which was active a few years ago was staffed mostly by western 
citizens.”
329
 This shows, although to a lesser degree, the same attitude which inspired the 
former article; in this case Ampelmann’s success seems entirely inexplicable without 
some significant degree of western involvement. These incidents, along with the 
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suggestion that Ampelfrau represents western attempts in the 1960s towards women 
obtaining the vote, show that the forging of collective memory through Ampelmann and 
his extended family are not limited solely to nostalgic easterners.
330
 Ampelmann has not 
saved Germans on both sides of the old border from their own ignorance; although he has 
played a part in increasing the lines of communication between Germany’s formerly 
estranged halves, it is important not to exaggerate the subtle societal shift he represents. 
      Nevertheless, Ampelmann illustrates a coming together of a remarkably rare variety. 
He has managed to open connections and lines of communication between east and west 
as Germans on both sides begin to appreciate the figure on each other’s terms while 
recognizing the values of the hat-wearer and, by extension (although to a much more 
limited degree), of one another. However limited the extent of this interaction may be, the 
acceptance of Ampelmann into the daily lives of Germans on both sides shows that such 
a unified recognition, communication, and existence, far from being myth, is occurring 
on street crossings across the country as Germans collectively reconstruct the meaning of 
the little man on the traffic lights. Indeed, the success of Ampelmann has been so 
pronounced that it has led many to ask (jokingly): “when will the committee to save the 
western Ampelmann come?”
331
 Most submit that this is, however, unlikely. 
Illuminating Similarities; Ampelmann and German Unity 
       Through opening these lines of communication, and through his successful 
movement into the west, Ampelmann has become a force for furthering German unity. 
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Although Ampelmann is not necessarily unique in his ability to appeal to concerns shared 
on both sides of the former border, his symbolic power accentuates his functionality 
above others, allowing for him to simultaneously project eastern values inherited from a 
reconstructed past and to bring together otherwise more divergent peoples and ideals in 
order to help craft a usable present. His entrance into the common language and culture 
of a unified Germany is evidence of this, as Ampelmann becomes increasingly 
commonplace he also becomes more profound, able to bring people together in 
increasingly subtle ways. His success does not, however, come without reservations. 
Indeed, Ampelmann has proven a rather problematic representative for the east as 
westerners reconstruct his image while, in the minds of some, representing a destructive 
misinterpretation of the eastern past which serves only to further the divide first solidified 
by the Berlin Wall. 
      Ampelmann’s ability to give form and expression to otherwise divergent schools of 
thought extends outside of his merging of narratives of capitalism and nostalgia, 
converging similar but parallel beliefs surrounding traffic safety. This began through the 
connection between Ampelmann and childhood traffic safety education in the GDR, as 
discussed in chapters 1 and 2. Here, the hat wearing figure became emblematic of the 
safety, security and innocence lost with the collapse of state socialism.
332
 The 
continuation of Ampelmann’s pedagogical role in the east after the fall of the Wall has 
been mirrored in the west. Reiner Niersmann, for example, much like his eastern 
counterpart, Hans the singing policeman, sang to elementary school children across the 
west, instructing them about the importance of, among other things, wearing bicycle 
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 Ampelmann featured prominently in his presentation, even when visiting the 
small town of Westrup where there were no traffic lights. Western police engaged in this 
as well, such as in the city of Hamburg where safety-conscious officers instructed 
children through a game where children had to identify symbols according to whether or 
not they were associated with traffic safety (of which Ampelmann was one).
334
 There is 
good reason for this. Der Spiegel reported that Germany has an unusually high accident 
rate among children. In 2004, for example, 328 of every 100,000 children were involved 
in a traffic accident compared to 261 in the UK, 159 in Italy and 62 in Denmark.
335
 This 
shows there was a need for a solution at the very moment Ampelmann began to spread 
into the west.  On one hand, these concerns, mirrored in the east, help to account for the 
rise of Ampelmann in the west, particularly once pragmatic arguments became accepted 
on both sides of the Wall. On the other, this set of common dilemmas can also account 
for the functionality of Ampelmann as a means for opening communication networks 
between the former halves. By providing an effective solution to a shared issue 
Ampelmann has become a means through which Germans can talk to one another, if only 
in a limited context, and appreciate the eastern figure on similar terms.  
      Ampelmann, although exceptional among eastern paraphernalia in his acceptance and 
spread into the west, was not the only solution to these traffic safety problems. The green 
arrow, another widely used traffic symbol from the GDR which told motorists when they 
could turn right, has also achieved a notable degree of success in post-Wall Germany. 
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Hamburg in particular has taken to the eastern traffic symbol, overtaking Dresden, in the 
words of one paper, as the “Capital of the green arrow.”
336
 Much like its hat-wearing 
colleague, the green arrow has won its place in the west through the sheer force of its 
own practicality. Experts and city officials across the country point out its ability to 
reduce accidents, help traffic flow more smoothly, and minimize congestion.
337
 The 
arrow is frequently compared to Ampelmann and listed among the handful of still useful 
things left over from the GDR. One commenter asserted that: “The GDR did it [the green 
arrow] first; not just the green Ampelmännchen has earned its place.”
338
 As a result, the 
green arrow has gone along with the acceptance of Ampelmann on capitalist grounds; it 
has achieved success and spread into the west due simply to its functionality. Various 
other solutions have been considered, such as an all green phase where pedestrians could 
walk freely through intersections, a timer to go along with pedestrian signals, and an 
extension of the green phase to give less agile pedestrians time to cross so that they may 
not be stuck in the middle of the road.
339
 Each of these, regardless of their ability to solve 
traffic related issues, has failed, however, to achieve the same ubiquity, renown and 
adoration which Ampelmann has obtained. Although these all have the potential of 
uniting Germans through their common concerns, the discussions regarding these, unlike 
those surrounding Ampelmann, have remained disjointed, unable to evoke the same zeal 
and energy.  It is thus through his combination of personality and practicality that 
Ampelmann has been able to function as a device through which eastern and western 
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Germans can explore their commonality, reflecting on their pasts and determining what 
value this has, thus finding security in an increasingly insecure world. 
      Ampelmann has also achieved a subtle yet significant degree of cultural ubiquity 
coinciding with his successful importation into the west. This shows the appeal of the 
figure and speaks to a more understated expression of togetherness. One of the most 
significant ways in which this has occurred is through the German lexicon. The first 
outright recognition of this came in 2000 when the Duden dictionary included 
Ampelmännchen among its newest additions.
340
 This reflects the use of the word not only 
to identify the figure but as a common expression. Indeed, Der Spiegel asserted that 
visitors to the 2006 FIFA world cup must “feel like the eastern Ampelmann, having to 
spread out before security officials.”
341
 Another article celebrated the 20
th
 anniversary of 
the fall of the Wall by listing a series of “phrases only Germans will understand,” 
including: “The GDR was an illegitimate state (Unrechtsstaat)
342
 but the 
Ampelmännchen were so sweet!”
343
 The use of Ampelmann in such a way appears to 
further support the role of the figure as a force for inner reunification, creating a common, 
Ampelmann-inclusive language – a secret known by everyone. 
     Indeed, Ampelmann’s appeal has broadened as he has entered ever further into 
German popular culture. The German version of Who Wants to be a Millionaire? (Wer 
wird Millionär?) participated in this process, featuring the eastern figure in 2011 with the 
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question, “In comparison to his western colleague, the East German Ampelmännchen is: 
a) well-bred b) assured c) cheerful d) hat-wearing.” The contestant, although earning the 
sympathy of the news reporter, was incorrect (although 99% of the audience got it), 
choosing ‘c’ instead of ‘d’.
344
 Rewe, a popular chain of supermarkets, contributed to this 
as well, including Ampelmann in its “declaration of love [to Germany] in 180 stickers” 
where for just 2 Euros, one could get a collection of stickers from “A, for 
Ampelmännchen to Z for Zoologischer Garten Berlin [the Berlin zoo].”
345
 The federal 
government also created a series of stamps featuring Ampelmann.
346
 One article 
compared Ampelmann to another well-known figure, the young boy whose face adorned 
Kinder chocolates for over 30 years.
347
 Ampelmann, then, has become normalized to an 
extent shared by few other eastern exports; he has become a symbol not just of the east, 
but for the country as a whole, showing that something representing eastern values, 
ideals, and hopes can enter into an otherwise western cultural landscape. 
      Coinciding with this, the selective reconstruction of Ampelmann, in particular his 
relationship to his western colleague, has transformed the figure into one emblematic of 
the German unity many wish for. The two Ampel-figures have recently been featured in a 
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theatrical production, called Hinterm Horizont by Udo Lindenberg.
348
 Partway through 
the show, meant to educate youths about the GDR through a cross-Wall love story, the 
eastern and western traffic light figures are shown on stage together, dancing as a sign of 
German unity. This performance elicits an immediate reaction from theatre goers:  
when Ampelmännchen runs across the stage…when tears of memory and emotion run 
from the audience…and when the actor playing Udo says: “Now we just need to fold 
away the rest of the wall in our heads” then it is clear: For Udo Lindenberg it is not 




On a similar note, a flag featuring Ampelmann triumphed in a competition entitled, 
“visions of German Unity,” winning Berlin artist Myriam Lucas the first prize. When 
providing images to represent the 15
th
 anniversary of German reunification, Neues 
Deutschland also included an image of the eastern and western traffic light figures 
holding hands.
350
 A book published in 2004 makes a similar argument, discussing the 
work remaining to complete German unity on both sides while sporting an Ampelmann 
on its cover. Commenting on this publication, one reporter stated that the book “bears his 
[Ampelmann’s] sponsorship.” Yet another article celebrated Ampelmann’s 50
th
 birthday 
with the compliment that he “does not quite look his age” before boasting that: “indeed 
he [Ampelmann] is now more than a traffic light figure; he is also a foundation of 
identity, a bestseller, and a winner of unity.”
351
 Ampelmann, and his success in both the 
east and west, has then become, for many, a symbol for German unity. This has been 
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aided on several fronts: by his privileged status amongst eastern exports, by his ability to 
open lines of communication along common concerns, and through his entrance into 
German mass culture. 
      Ampelmann is not, however, as is frequently pointed out by Germans of all 
persuasions, a panacea to the problems still facing German unity. The responses of 
Germans on both sides point to several key limitations of Ampelmann and his ability to 
represent and forge inner unity. The most common among these concerns is also perhaps 
the most simple; many, although not necessarily lamenting the success of Ampelmann, 
express a desire that Germany could have, in the words of CDU member Thomas de 
Maiziere, “adopted a bit more than Ampelmännchen or the green arrow” from the 
GDR.
352
 The federal government voiced a similar complaint, implementing education 
programs across the country to teach students about the GDR so that “the memory of the 
GDR won’t simply be based off of Ampelmann and Trabis.”
353
 Others point out that 
Ampelmann, although perhaps the most popular thing left over from the GDR, is not 
alone as many suggest a visit to the Stasi prison Hohenschönhausen as an antidote to 
Ampelmann-centric history. “The GDR,” in the words of another article, “was not a land 
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of Ampelmann but a dictatorship.”
354
 The director of the Stasi archives agreed, saying 
that Ampelmann memory threatens to turn “the GDR into Disneyland.”
355
 
      Other concerns surrounding Ampelmann express disdain for his commercialization, 
question his ability to act as a figure of more than a surface-level unity, and even reject 
the post-Wall status he has obtained. The first of these concerns is the most frequently 
vocalized, particularly by those who point out the crippling irony of commodifying a 
figure from a socialist country. Neues Deutschland made such a point in 2005, expressing 
dislike for both the western and eastern traffic light figures before arguing that the latter 
“ought not to be a commodity but rather something owned by the eastern community.” 
Unfortunately, the article lamented, Ampelmann “needs to carry his hat to market.”
356
 On 
a similar note, one paper pointed out many shops which violate laws demanding they 
close on Sundays by selling souvenir items such as Ampelmann T-shirts. Here, 
Ampelmann represents nothing more than a legal loophole.
357
 Others have focused on the 
inability of Ampelmann to make significant changes; one author, addressing the problems 
integrating Muslims into German society, suggested that “after the completely failed 
integration of the easterners, they [westerners] should perhaps try with Muslims. Do 
Muslims have something like an Ampelmann in their culture? We could introduce 
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 This scathing assault attempts to point out the perceived emptiness which the 
success of Ampelmann represents; by arguing that German-German integration failed, 
and by suggesting that an Ampelmann-like figure simply be made up for another group, 
the author questions the authenticity and effectiveness of Ampelmann as a symbol while 
emphasizing the foreignness of the east. 
      Several other sources speak to this same point. Berliner Zeitung typified this in a 
1998 article beginning with an all too common question; “What is left from the GDR?” 
The list, as ever, is regrettably small and specifically focused: “Trabants, 
Ampelmännchen, the green arrow and Rotkäppchen sekt.”
359
 Of these, Ampelmann is the 
one most typically selected for criticism, particularly because he represents the GDR in 
an ideological, personified, and thus more widely accepted way. Although many criticise 
Trabant enthusiasts as misrepresenting the GDR, none refer to this version of the GDR as 
a “Trabant dictatorship” or a history with “driving Trabants” as they do with the hat 
wearer who represents an “Ampelmann dictatorship” or a history with “jumping 
Ampelmännchen.”
360
 It is Ampelmann’s likability and success, along with the hopes and 
values transposed upon him, which elicit this response. Ampelmann’s privileged position 
as one of the few exports from the GDR to survive comes as both a blessing – allowing 
for the figure to succeed and be valued more than he would otherwise be – as well as a 
curse –  arraying against the figure scorn which he might not receive if the post-Wall 
landscape was not so empty of eastern icons. Although Ampelmann can help to work 
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towards the ideals which the most passionate Ampel-enthusiasts envision, and can serve 
as a means through which east and west can communicate, appreciate, and understand 
each other on acceptable terms, he cannot do everything. 
Conclusion 
     The integration of Ampelmann into the western milieu is not simply a narrative of 
western exploitation and commodification but instead a more complex process through 
which eastern values and memory are adapted to present situations in order to create the 
image of a usable capitalism and open previously closed lines of communications 
between east and west. Rather than passive, docile, and tactless victims of a structure they 
do not comprehend, easterners are actively engaged in meeting with, adapting to, and 
combating the challenges of western capitalism. In so doing, they not only are reforming 
the image of their traffic light figure, but also creating a usable present where the systems 
which form their new society are not arrayed, terrifyingly, against them, but rather appear 
friendly, safe, and even desirable. This adaptation is not limited to merely making some 
carefully picked elements of the capitalist system compatible with the memory of state 
socialism. Indeed by adopting western values, easterners have perhaps earned the 
approval, recognition, and acceptance of their western countrymen, allowing their figure 
to be judged on its own merits and to spread underneath the former boundaries of the Iron 
Curtain into the heart of the west itself. 
       By accepting the socialist Ampelmännchen, westerners have assessed him not just on 
their own terms by focusing on the practical aspects of the figure but have also validated 
eastern arguments centring around the ‘cuteness’ and ‘likability’ of the hat wearing 
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guardian. This acceptance, along with the adapted ideological ethos surrounding 
Ampelmann, may have furthered the project for internal German unity by giving 
Germans on both sides of the old border the ability to assess and appreciate each other in 
terms they can understand. Ampelmann is not, however, a panacea for the innumerable 
problems which plague the Berlin Republic. Indeed, many see the figure less as a means 
through which past trauma and experience can be used towards the forging of a more 
acceptable future but rather as a tool of naivety at best or outright distortion at worst. 
These voices, polarized along the lines of the nostalgic and anti-nostalgic, are, however, 
in the minority. By focusing on selected aspects of Ampelmann’s commodification, East 
Germans have reconstructed the capitalist present, proposing improvements influenced 
by their socialist past. By providing a point at which eastern and western values can 
converge, Ampelmann has perhaps furthered German unity by giving those on both sides 






Chapter 4: Ampelmann Goes Global 
      If one were to wander curiously into the Ampelmann store on Unter den Linden just 
past Berlin’s Pariser Platz, one is likely to find a small booklet entitled, Ampelmann Reise 
Durch Japan (Ampelmann Journeys through Japan). This colourful booklet tells the story 
of a green sponge Ampelmann and his adventures in Japan. With text in both German and 
Japanese, Ampelmann is shown playing with a small child on a Japanese street crossing, 
telling her: “Come! I will help you cross the street” when she picks him up (see appendix 
4).
361
 Through the rest of this publication, Ampelmann visits Japanese spas, samples the 
goods at Japanese stores and visits famous landmarks such as the Golden Temple in 
Kyoto, Mount Fuji, and even one of Central Berlin’s sister cities, Tsuwano.
362
 Amidst 
photos of the green Ampelmann and locals mimicking his pose, he can also be seen 
greeting his Japanese traffic light colleague: “Hello colleague, I see that you also wear a 
hat.”
363
 The pamphlet ends as Ampelmann declares: “Japan was fun, but now I have to 
see what’s going on at home”
364




      This pamphlet, assembled during a 2010 trip by a group from Ampelmann GmbH, 
appears at first to be an unusual artifact.
366
 It seems at the very least odd that the eastern 
traffic light figure would make a journey abroad, let alone to a distant capitalist country 
which East Germans would not have even been able to visit during the GDR era. A 
description in the back raises even more questions: 
                                                 
361
 Ampelmann GmbH, Ampelmann Reise Durch Japan, 2010, 4. 
362
 Ibid., 24, 20, 27. 
363
 Ibid., 38. 
364
 Ibid., 40. 
365
 Ibid., back cover. 
366
 Ibid., 41. 
106 
 
In October 2010, the Ampelmann sponge, along with his bosses, went on a business 
trip to Japan. The occasion was a presentation at the German embassy in Tokyo on 
October 3
rd
. Those who came along for the trip then set out to look at potential 
locations for the first Ampelmann shop in the country, and to obtain an impression of 
the local culture. Everywhere we photographed Ampelmann the Japanese were quite 
pleased to be there.
367
 
Understanding just why an Ampelmann shop opened in Tokyo shortly after the 2010 trip, 
why the Japanese were so excited to meet the East German traffic light figure and why, 
given all of this, a colourful pamphlet was made to document the experience helps to 
explain yet another way Ampelmann has been used to make the modern world appear 
accepting, appreciative, and friendly to easterners who may otherwise see globalization as 
cold, alienating, and destructive. 
      Part of the appeal of this pamphlet can be explained by East Germans’ experiences of 
vacationing in the GDR and the gap between principle and practice with regard to 
vacationing in post-Wall Germany. Holidays, much like all leisure activities in the GDR, 
revolved around patterns distinctly different from those in the capitalist West. The 
overwhelming majority of vacations were state organized, either through trade unions or 
through the state travel agency.
368
 These vacations were cheap, providing access to fresh 
air and leisure facilities, and surprisingly widespread with as much as 80% of the 
population vacationing every year by the 1980s.
369
 But these holidays were also 
characterized by poor or insufficient facilities, and choice destinations were reserved for 
those in the upper echelons of the GDR’s de facto class system. Opportunities for those 
with special requirements, such as diabetics, were also severely limited. The choice of 
destinations was restricted: only around 20% of vacationers left the GDR, and those that 
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did generally visited neighbouring Eastern Bloc countries.
370
 This contrasts with the 
opportunities available in capitalist society. Theoretically, east Germans are now free to 
vacation wherever they wish although, given the various economic issues still facing the 
new states, many cannot afford to do so. On one level then, Ampelmann Reise Durch 
Japan can be seen as a sort of wish fulfillment, superseding the limitations in place in 
both the GDR and in the Berlin Republic. But this is not the only explanation. 
      Indeed, in much the same way that Ampelmann has been used to recast the GDR past 
and the westernized present, he has also been used, primarily by easterners but also by 
those in the west, to reconstruct the image of a rapidly globalizing world. He reshapes the 
world into one which can appreciate east German values, communicate globally on 
familiar terms, and be understandable to those who could once only dream about poking 
out from under the Iron Curtain. This process, which began surprisingly early in the post-
Wall Ampelmann narrative, has its roots in the tourist culture surrounding Berlin in 
particular as Ampelmann’s popularity as a souvenir and figure of the streets permitted 
fluid interactions between visitors and local culture. Problems arose from this as 
Ampelmann’s image, as perceived by tourists, has developed a particularly Berlin-centric 
bias, resulting in the ‘Berlinification’ of the East German figure.
371
 Nevertheless, the 
responses of easterners, conflated with those of peoples around the world, has allowed for 
Ampelmann to represent a friendly, welcoming vision of globalization by working to 
resolve the natural conflict between local and global by making the local global. 
Ampelmann’s journey outside of the east has expanded in rapid, unexpected ways as the 
                                                 
370
 Fulbrook, The People’s State, 78. 
371
 This is a term which I will be using in this chapter to describe the process through which Ampelmann 
has become synonymous with the city of Berlin above and beyond his actual presence in the city, thus 
neglecting his status across the east more generally.  
108 
 
traffic light figure makes his mark on the traffic lights and symbolic landscapes of the 
world. Ampelmann has thus managed to reconstruct and export the GDR’s past and its 
perceived values across the world while simultaneously providing an antidote to the 
pangs of globalization by presenting an alternative where the world appears to look to the 
east with an understanding, appreciative, and accepting gaze, even if Ampelmann’s 
“cuteness” is his main attraction. 
      Much like the adoption of capitalist arguments in support of Ampelmann, the 
internationalization of the traffic light figure began quite early in his post-Wall career. 
Elements of this were already present in the 1997 publication Das Buch vom 
Ampelmännchen as a result of the committee’s online presence. A concerned citizen of 
Papua-New Guinea contributed a letter to the book, declaring that the elimination of 
Ampelmann lights “…cannot seriously be in the interests of a society which is so fraught 
with problems.”
372
 Other “internet pedestrians” of which there were about 50,000, 
agreed.
373
 One visitor to the website from the United Kingdom left a message declaring 
that: “I can’t understand a word of this, as I don’t speak German. But if, as I suspect, it is 
a campaign to save the little men on the street crossing, then I am all in favour.”
374
 
Another visitor from Denmark had big dreams for the little figure, writing:  
To whom it may concern, I would like to express my support for Das 
Ampelmännchen. He’s the most human of traffic-lights and in my humble opinion he 
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A fold out in the back of the book contributes to Ampelmann’s internationalization as 
well, depicting the East German Ampelmann alongside his colleagues from West 




      Other early articles reveal similar trends. Several sources refer to one of the founders 
of the committee, Jörg Davids, in response to the planned removal of Ampelmann lights 
in eastern Berlin. Appalled by the suggestions made by the European Union that 
Ampelmann “cannot be integrated into the new codex [for traffic lights],”
377
 Davids 
revealed plans to appeal to the whole of Europe in order to save the figure, while 
simultaneously drawing on an international, socialist spirit, under the slogan, “Traffic 
light figures of the world, unite!”
378
 In 1998 Ampelmann even managed to make it into 
the New York Times, which ran an article on him declaring that he “has even arrived in 
the United States where Ampelmann key chains are sold in design stores like Moss in 
SoHo.”
379
 It then goes on to explain that Ampelmann “has really struck a chord in 
Germany…East Germans had the lamp man drilled into their heads from Kindergarten 
on. Oddly, West Germans love the lamp man, too.”
380
 Next, the author describes the 
appeal of the figure saying that Ampelmann “is a symbol of a simpler, happier past. He is 
a relic from an inhumane regime that in retrospect seems in some ways more human than 
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the capitalist regime East Germans have joined.”
381
 The globalization of Ampelmann 
comes out here, too, as the author declares that defending Ampelmann is the same as 
“[defending] local dishes against McDonald’s” and that “The conflict between Euro and 
regional is part of the wider conflict between global and local.” The piece concludes with 
amazing foresight, arguing that:  
The common currencies, common markets and common products of the global 
economy promise to make us all richer but not necessarily happier. The more people 
are asked to reason globally, it seems, the more they are driven to feel locally.
382
 
Ampelmann’s internationalization thus began surprisingly early on. From the start, 
Ampel-advocates put their struggle into an international context, drawing support and 
inspiration from pedestrians around the world while using Ampelmann against the forces 
of globalization, winning international recognition and praise along the way. 
      This process continued over the following years, with tourism playing an increasingly 
significant role. The most powerful force in this domain has been, as one might expect, 
the series of souvenir stores run by Markus Heckhausen, as well as others that sell 
Ampelmann products, often from Ampelmann GmbH but occasionally not. Since the 
popularization of Ampelmann through the Ampelmann stores, he has become at once one 
of the most popular, resented, beloved, and emblematic symbols in the tourism sector. 
This has taken place particularly in Berlin where, according to Der Tagesspiegel, shops 
make 18% of their revenue off of tourists (other major cities, by comparison, can attribute 
10-15% to this).
383
 As a result of their popularity, Ampelmann goods have become 
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stereotypical for Berlin tourists. Sometimes this is presented positively, with some 
depicting Ampelmann as a “classic” purchase for visitors while others grudgingly admit 
that the typical Berlin tourist would “have Ampelmann merchandise with them.”
384
 As a 
result, Ampelmann is often one of the aspects of Germany which makes the most 
significant impression upon visitors. One journalist from the UK referred to the figure as 
“a gentle historical allusion at the traffic lights.”
385
 Another visitor from California, while 
showing off his bag of Ampelmann sweets, mentioned how a German friend told him 
that: “Eastern traffic light figures are now taking over the west and that they are quite 
excited about this.”
386
 On a school trip, a group of students from the UK were so excited 




      Some more well-known visitors to the country have also expressed their fondness for 
the eastern figure. While filming in Berlin, director Steven Spielberg was seen wearing an 
Ampelmann t-shirt.
388
 A Mexican Opera singer of Austrian decent, Ronaldo Villazon, 
also revealed his affection for Ampelmann, pointing the traffic light man out as one of the 
first things he saw during his visit to Berlin and including Ampelmann among the things 
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which “look just like from my textbooks!”
389
 More recently, reporters spotted the first 
daughters of the United States, Malia and Sasha Obama, enjoying an Ampel-experience. 
Accompanied by a substantial security outfit, the two visited the Potsdamer Platz 
Arkaden (a mall in central Berlin).
390
 “The Obama daughters” in the words of one article  
did not get to enjoy Berlin like normal tourists…they did, however, get a break from 
their otherwise serious schedule of visiting the Holocaust Memorial and the Berlin 
Wall Memorial to visit the Potsdamer Platz Arkaden. There are thousands of malls 
like it in the USA but they did get to visit one store which there probably is not in the 
US: the Ampelmann store which is loved by tourists from around the world.
391
 
 Malia was seen leaving the Ampelmann store with “an Ampelmann bag filled with 
Berlin souvenirs” including an Ampelmann key chain, a black hat and a Berlin T-shirt.
392
 
Eastern interpretations of Ampelmann’s international adoration reflect a desire already 
seen in the western response to Ampelmann’s success. Here, the figure itself and, by 
extension, the eastern ideals he has come to represent, are shown to have a value which 
tourists from around the world can appreciate. Rather than being cast off as an ancient 
relic or otherwise diminished by globalization, Ampelmann is instead frequently 
portrayed as a victor in the struggle to win the hearts of international pedestrians. 
     The role and authenticity of Ampelmann as an object of tourist adoration has, 
however, occasionally been brought into question. One shop owner from Heidelberg, 
whose shop includes Ampelmann merchandise among its wares, mentioned the 
popularity of the figure with Japanese tourists, stating that: “the tourists often do not 
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understand the language and have just a little time on their vacation so they enjoy buying 
whatever they want from one place.”
393
 This implies that these people buy Ampelmann 
products not because of experience with or understanding of the figure, but instead 
because his merchandise is simply there and is intrinsically appealing. Markus 
Heckhausen admitted something similar, saying that: “tourists are absolutely crazy for the 
small Ampelmann with the round nose. They think that he is the typical Berlin 
Ampelmann, they don’t know the eastern history at all.”
394
 The merchandising manager 
for Humboldt University, commenting on tourists who buy Humboldt t-shirts, agreed, 
declaring that: “it is far better than a dumb Ampelmännchen.”
395
 The popularization of 
Ampelmann as an object of tourist desire has not always been an expression of 
appreciation for his easternness. Nevertheless, his popularity still shows a value which 
can be ascribed to eastern ideas; when faced with the often intimidating forces of 
globalization, the local does not always have to be subjugated. 
      A peculiarity which has arisen from the popularity of Ampelmann as a tourist icon is 
his Berlinification. Although Ampelmann began in Berlin, with the first light on Unter 
den Linden Boulevard, his image could be seen across the GDR, both before and after the 
fall of the Wall. Indeed, as we have already seen, other areas, such as Thuringia, moved 
more quickly in defense of the eastern figure than did the German capital.
396
 Despite this, 
the popularity of Ampelmann as a tourist figure has resulted in his automatic 
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identification with Berlin, its culture, and its streetscape. Ampelmann’s Berlinification 
began with the Ampelmann stores themselves. Although Ampelmann goods can be found 
across the country, such as the shop in Heidelberg mentioned earlier, all five Ampelmann 
stores in the country are located in Berlin. Furthermore, a great deal of the Ampelmann 
goods available there are associated with Berlin. The shops sell, for example, a postcard 
featuring a stork carrying the red and green Ampelmann proclaiming that Berlin is “the 
birthplace of the East German Ampelmann” (see appendix 5).
 397
 A different postcard 
features Ampelmann standing in front of the Berlin skyline, in another one he walks 
alongside a stylized TV tower.
398
 There is, then, a great deal of paraphernalia suggesting 
a connection between Berlin and Ampelmann which excludes the traffic light figures’ 
easternness more generally. 
      Many artistic and cultural representations support the connection between 
Ampelmann and Berlin. The Blue Man Group’s first European show in Berlin, for 
example, featured Ampelmann alongside the Brandenburg Gate as part of their desire not 
to simply import their American show.
399
 Another theatrical production depicted the life 
of a disgruntled Ampelmann. This show, entitled “Green boys – the traffic light is not 
enough” opened in Berlin’s Admiralpalast and tells the story of the eastern traffic light 
figure who has had enough of his light and decides to break free on a journey of 
discovery through Berlin.
400
  An Ampelmann store has also been chosen to do business in 
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a large shopping complex in the Berlin Brandenburg Airport meant to showcase local 
goods.
401
 One article lamented that many locals and long-time residents no longer 
appreciated the beauty of Berlin: “The people who realise this [the beauty of the city],” 
by contrast, “are those who notice Ampelmann, begin to walk across the street but then 
go back, smiling to take a photo of him with their camera.”
402
 
      More commonly, Ampelmann is depicted as emblematic of the city and its former 
division. On this note, one article focused on Berlin’s Rosa-Luxembourg street where a 
signal on the corner depicted both the eastern and western figures.
403
 A Berliner Zeitung 
writer advised that the eastern parts of the city could be identified by the “green, cheery 
Ampelmann with the hat” whereas the west contained a figure that “…marches 
straightforward without head movements, but is strong like a Bundeswehr soldier.”
404
 As 
a result, the replacement of western lights with the eastern figure, while generally 
positively received, has occasionally been met with disapproval as “it reduces the 
visibility of the two former halves of city, particularly to tourists who may be interested 
in the history of the city.”
405
 Indeed, this last point may very well impact the experience 
of tourists given the disappearance of many other distinguishing features of Berlin’s 
former division. The distinction between the two figures was a common tip for those 
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wishing to know which side of the former Wall they were on: “if it’s wearing a hat, 
you’re in the east” advised one commenter in response to a Guardian article.
406
  
      Nevertheless, the Berlinification of Ampelmann, although lacking any sense of 
subtlety, seems to have gone largely unnoticed. Focusing on Ampelmann’s connection 
with Berlin to the exclusion of his relationship to the east more generally is problematic. 
Ampelmann’s Berlinification shows that as he becomes a figure of globalization he is 
beginning to lose the easternness and sense of eastern unity which helped save him and 
spread his popularity. Nevertheless, tourists, much like the smiling people in Ampelmann 
Journeys through Japan, have become a way through which easterners focus on the love 
for and value of their figure in the eyes of people from around the world.  
      East Germans have also used Ampelmann to make globalization and the world at 
large appear smiling, friendly and welcoming. This process, as we have already seen, 
began quite early as the Save the Ampelmännchen Committee globalized the movement 
to save their beloved figure by drawing in international supporters through the internet 
and situating their Ampelmann within a worldwide context of traffic light figures.
407
 This 
representation expanded rapidly in the 21
st
 Century as the Ampelmann stores began to 
sell postcards, posters and other paraphernalia placing Ampelmann among his worldwide 
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 One poster, depicting the eastern figure alongside light people from 
Mallorca, Cuba, China, and several other countries, sums up the thrust of these images: 
Regardless of which land one visits they are everywhere and bring us safely across 
the street: The Ampelmännchen. Whether thick or thin, elegant or awkward, by 
themselves or in a pair, with hat or pants; they are so different, just like the people for 
whom they work. Ampelmann [GmbH] presents here a small sample of the 
worldwide colleagues of the East German Ampelmännchen.
409
 
This shows a significant shift in the Ampelmann narrative; whereas earlier he was in 
competition with his western colleague, now they stand together, part of a red-and-green 
coalition of traffic light figures of all conceivable shapes and sizes. Ampelmann is able to 
walk among these, an equal surrounded by a world of brightly lit, friendly, and unique 
colleagues (see appendix 6). Other products portray similar images, although sometimes 
with a more competitive tone; one postcard shows a globe with running green men and a 
red one in the centre declaring: “Go north, east, south or west, ‘Berlin-Ampelmännchen’ 
are the best”
410
 (see appendix 7). Ampelmann products thus portray a world which is 
understandable – one where traffic light figures watch over the patterns of daily life and 
direct, in their own special way, the peoples of the world who are united in their crossing 
of streets, if nothing else. 
      Ampelmann’s globalization, however, extends well beyond the products of the 
Ampelmann stores. Indeed, numerous East German publications have idealized 
Ampelmann’s globalization. Upon the construction of a new Ampelmann restaurant in 
Berlin serving Italian food, one paper went on to describe how “the colours of 
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Ampelmann go quite well with the Italian flag,” saying that the restaurant will include 
“bread baked in stone ovens, handmade pasta and, of course, Ampelmann noodles.” 
“There is even,” the author described “a special table in the front of the restaurant for 
children.”
411
 Another discussed an international running competition held in Berlin in 
2009. After multiple false starts, the attention of those watching was drawn to the red 
East German Ampelmann being used to guide the runners. “Now,” the paper stated, “the 
GDR-greeting has spread through the world from the Olympic Stadium.”
412
 The 
Vancouver Olympics also became part of this narrative; one article referred to the mascot 
for the events, Inuksuk, as a “type of Ampelmann,” as it “showed native Canadians the 
way.”
413
 There is a problem with this, however, as the article asserts that Inuksuk “was 
not a symbol used by aboriginal peoples in that area, but rather in the north. Totem poles 
were more common in the Vancouver area.”
414
 In a less conventional comparison, one 
author referred to a female North Korean traffic officer given a Hero of Labour award by 
Kim Jong Un as “Kim’s Ampelfrau.”
415
  
      West Germans have joined in the internationalization of Ampelmann as well. Die 
Welt, for example, described the similarities between Berlin and Seoul, saying that 
“Although Seoul lays 8000 kilometers from Berlin, there is still quite a lot in the South 
Korean Capital which reminds one of the German metropolis,” including Ampelmann, 
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buddy bears and currywurst.
416
 The scholars responsible for the study out of Bremen’s 
Jacob University also participated in the internationalization of the eastern figure, 
planning another study to “prove the effectiveness of the European Ampelmann,” which 
meant, according to one paper: “to recommend the eastern Ampelmann across 
Europe.”
417
 In this way, Ampelmann has become a tool with which easterners and 
Germans as a whole can understand and analyze the world at large. These narratives do 
not focus on what sets different places apart but rather the shared concerns and traffic 
light figures which bring them together. 
      The globalization of Ampelmann is, nevertheless, not limited to Germans looking 
outward, but rather extends as people across the world express their appreciation of the 
traffic light man. The Ampelmann stores which opened in Tokyo, Japan and Seoul, South 
Korea, embody perhaps better than anything else the acceptance and success of the 
eastern traffic light figure. These stores are frequently cited in publications across 
Germany and help to further explain the smiling, excited locals in Ampelmann Journeys 
Through Japan.
418
 Indeed, Ampelmann has become one of the mascots for the Japanese 
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airline ANA (All Nippon Airways), where he can be seen adorning airport shuttles, 
depicted alongside Tokyo landmarks and wearing a pilot hat.
419
 The UK has also 
developed a fondness for the eastern figure. One writer in The Guardian criticised the 
western figure, saying that “he or she is not considered to be a tourist attraction, much 
less a classic of everyday design” while calling Ampelmann “chubby and cartoonish.”
420
 
The Daily Mail also referred to the study out of Bremen, praising Ampelmann and 
suggesting that he “may soon become the norm across the whole of Europe including the 
UK.”
421
 The UK Department for Transport shot back, however, “we’ve no plans to 
change… The one we’ve got works very well and are [sic] easily understood.”
422
 Other 
countries have joined the ranks of Ampel-enthusiasts. According to Berliner Kurier: 
It is amazing how many people are interested in the East German Ampelmann. The 
British Financial Times did a full page on it, Japanese and Brazilian papers also 
reported on it and Ampelmann was featured on Spanish television.
423
  
Ampelmann may even be crossing into the New World. Heckhausen and city officials in 
Los Angeles have discussed plans to bring the light figure to Hollywood.
424
 The 
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international response to Ampelmann reveals that the image of a friendly, welcoming and 
appreciative world as envisioned by easterners (and westerners) through Ampelmann 
often reflects reality. 
      For those both within Germany and abroad the international appreciation of 
Ampelmann has had even further implications as Ampelmann has become a means 
through which certain aspects of German and eastern culture can be understood and 
expressed. The death of a young German Broadway star in New York as the result of a 
driver who didn’t heed proper street safety allowed an east German reporter to extol 
German traffic safety values. The reporter blamed the performer’s death on the disrespect 
for traffic lights in New York City, saying that the American Ampelmann has “nothing to 
say. One can cross on either red or green, one simply has to make sure that no cars are 
coming.” The reporter then compared this to Berlin:  
It is amusing to watch how faithfully most Berlin pedestrians wait for their traffic 
light. When I let a pedestrian cross the street here [in Berlin] because he has 
green, he looks at me mistrustfully…as if he will cause me pain, not I him. This 




 A New Yorker visiting Berlin commented on a similar topic; describing how he “tries 
running, but is stopped every few minutes by the Berliner Ampelmännchen” and that he  
wants to go by red – like any normal New Yorker, but that doesn’t work here. When 
you cross on a red…the drivers do not drive slower when they see you, like in New 
York, but instead they press the gas down as if they want to run you down.  
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“Whoever breaks the law,” he quoted one lady as saying, “earns death.”
426
 One author 
contrasted this strictness with the cuteness of Ampelmann, explaining how one local 
yelled “child murderer” at him when he was jay-walking, saying about the traffic light 
man that:  
Some Germans may say that the way easterners cherish Peglau’s design is a case of 
pure “Ostalgie”…, yet there is no getting away from the fact that the Ampelmännchen 




 In this way, Ampelmann has also become a means through which foreigners can 
understand, appreciate and, sometimes poke fun at the German values surrounding traffic 
safety. Ampelmann has thus succeeded as a vehicle through which ideals of traffic safety 
held by Germans in both the East and West can be preserved, distilled, and rewritten into 
a friendly language acceptable to people around the world. 
      While this reconstruction of globalization’s image may, at first, appear to be an 
innocent, generally harmless endeavour, literature on new social movements suggests that 
Ampelmann is, in some small but significant way, being used to challenge globalized 
neoliberal hegemony. These social movements are “informally organized, leaving to 
participants a high degree of autonomy,” they focus on “neoliberal globalization” and 
they show an “understanding of global problems and their causes.”
428
Reimagining the 
process of globalization through Ampelmann aligns with the definitions of these social 
movements presented above and by S.A. Hamed Hosseini in his book Alternative 
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 Hosseini describes these movements as having “…some 
common features. Among them is the common sense and experience of ‘globality’ – i.e. 
the quality of having worldwide inclusiveness, reach…”
430
 He continues that solidarity 
between these movements allows for the “promoting [of] an egalitarian and democratic 
form of globalization.”
431
 This definition is one which Ampelmann easily conforms to; 
those reconstructing the image of globalization through him certainly have a sense of 
“globality,” as seen through the internationalization of the figure through tourism, 
culture, and (paradoxically enough) his commercialization. Their aims, promoting 
selected values from their past and forming a usable, more egalitarian and representative 
present, also align with the aims of social movements: a criticism of the status quo as it 
stands and a suggestion that changes, however moderate or radical they may be, are 
necessary to achieve a more equitable existence. 
      But the Ampelmann-centric reimagining of the globalizing present, due perhaps to its 
origins in the socialist past, does not align perfectly with typical understandings of new 
social movements. Perhaps the most crucial element lacking in this respect is, well, 
movement. David McNally, in his call for revolutionary action against the neoliberal 
ruling class, describes this movement: “It is in the course of mobilizing – in the process 
of reclaiming the streets…that people gain a sense of their own power, expand their 
horizons and begin to imagine that another world is truly possible.”
432
 This explanation 
contrasts with the lived reality of Ampelmann-enthusiasts. Although they may well have 
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imagined a better present (and future), they have not engaged in its construction as 
actively as those staging protests, strikes, and demonstrations.  
      East Germans are also more moderate than their revolutionary sisters and brothers, 
given their calls not to get rid of, but rather to work within the capitalist system. East 
German moderation can most likely be attributed to the memory of state socialism itself. 
Those using Ampelmann have, for the most part, experienced state socialism; they have 
seen the terror and oppression upon which the East German system was founded. As a 
result they seek not to return to the past or the entirety of its ideals, but instead aim to find 
a middle ground between the extremes of state socialism and unchecked neoliberal 
hegemony. In the same way that protesters, for instance, have used the memory “of the 
great strikes that had won the union, of the times when workers fought police or 
troops”
433
 to fuel their cause, easterners and others have used the memory of socialist 
oppression to suggest a more egalitarian, responsible, and friendlier future. This is done 
not through organizing strikes or demonstrations but rather through the simple act of 
crossing the street and tipping your hat to little man who helps you along the way. 
      Ampelmann Journeys through Japan is not an anomalous creation. It rather reflects a 
much larger trend as eastern and western Germans have used the eastern traffic light 
figure as a means through which the globalizing present can be recast into a usable form 
with a friendly face. The smiling locals, playful interactions, bright colours and 
destinations depicted in the pamphlet show an image echoed throughout the modern 
discourse on Ampelmann: a world accepting of the eastern figure, willing to consider the 
values he represents, and thus one which appears playful, connected, respectful, and 
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human. This image, constructed through Ampelmann but occasionally mirrored in reality, 
shows a world of common values, particularly with regard to traffic safety. This world 
also has a strongly defined sense of local differences and variations, be they Kyoto’s 
golden temple or the hat-wearing traffic light figure who guides people across the street 
on their way to visit it. The discourse surrounding Ampelmann’s globalization aligns 
with the western interpretations of Ampelmann examined in the previous chapter as both 
capitalist-style pragmatic arguments and nostalgic appreciation are taken into 
consideration and accepted by people throughout the country, the continent, and the 
world. In an effort to fulfill the desires born in a restricted society and to cope with the 
limitations of a neoliberal, globalizing present, easterners have turned to their traffic light 
figure, imbued him with their values and used him to examine the present, forge a usable 




Conclusion: Crossing Past and Present 
      The ability of Ampelmann to link past and present, to merge memory and nostalgia, 
to bring forth socialist values and point them towards the modern world is considerable 
and significant. From his comparatively humble origins in the GDR as a traffic guardian, 
pedagogical instrument, and television star, Ampelmann has expanded. Eastern 
discontent, while critical, is not the sole fuel for this; the schism between the socialist 
values of the past and the capitalist ones of the present and the desire to find a middle 
ground in-between is also significant. More than just a token a longing for the past or a 
vehicle of capitalist exploitation, then, Ampelmann has become a multivalent 
representative of eastern values, traditions, identity, and hopes.  
      The GDR’s response to the pressing problems of traffic and traffic safety beginning in 
the early 1960s played a significant role in the way Ampelmann developed after 
reunification. In response to the ‘modern’ problems arising from increasing street 
congestion, the GDR unleashed a thorough, deeply involved campaign aiming to collect 
data regarding traffic safety and to respond to this problem. Their solution involved more 
direct measures, such as improving the quality and co-ordination of traffic lights, and less 
pointed ones aimed at educating the population and creating a culture of traffic safety. 
Part of this solution involved the public praising and shaming of drivers and pedestrians 
in state publications. Another saw teachers and traffic police instructing children on the 
importance of traffic safety. Ampelmann emerged here as an instrument of traffic safety 
education as his image adorned objects given to children and his face graced television 
screens across the country. In this way, he was intricately tied to GDR traffic safety 
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culture, a portion of the East German past where the state appeared concerned and caring 
and which would later be deemed valuable to the Berlin Republic. 
      The fall of the Berlin Wall shook up this Ampel-narrative as the little man quickly 
found his position threatened by the faceless western figure. Once eastern apathy 
subsided, however, Ampelmann’s transformation into a lieu of East German memory 
began. This involved resurrecting GDR rituals of traffic safety and infusing Ampelmann 
with a sense of easternness and eastern values. These values included the control, safety, 
simplicity, innocence, and equity (particularly between genders) easterners perceived as 
being absent from but valuable to the modern republic. In doing so, easterners turned 
Ampelmann into an Eingabe, a sort of customer complaint about their position in 
contemporary Germany. 
      The values of the present have also shaped Ampelmann’s function. His collision with 
capitalism has undoubtedly resulted, as many scholars have pointed out, in an often 
problematic commodification of the eastern past. Nevertheless, in reflecting on 
Ampelmann’s commodification, easterners have used their traffic light figure to imagine 
a more usable form of capitalism where local production, values, and identity are 
respected. Such a reimaging has opened the gates and allowed for the east German traffic 
light figure to spread into the west. It has also permitted an alternative view of German 
unity where eastern history, innovation, and identity are valued by the west and where 
western capitalism is adapted, albeit in a moderately altered form. 
      Ampelmann’s popularity worldwide has functioned similarly, allowing easterners to 
understand and envision modifications to globalization. In this narrative, Ampelmann is 
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able to stand amongst his worldwide traffic light comrades, a symbol of respected and 
appreciated eastern distinction in a globalized world. Here, the world appears welcoming, 
friendly, and open in a way it was not during the GDR’s existence. This is not entirely 
constructed either as international publications have released articles praising the 
characteristics of the traffic light man. Although lacking any real movement, this 
alternative image aligns roughly with those involved in new social movements as east 
Germans suggest alterations to the present infused with their own ideals from the socialist 
past. This image is, however, more moderate than those proposed by many others. 
Having experienced both neoliberal capitalism and state socialism, easterners now 
envision a world in-between the two. 
      Those assuming the emptiness of the East German traffic light figure thus do so at 
their own peril. Honestly examining the past and present of this complex lieu de mémoire 
reveals a great deal about the GDR, the way it is remembered, and the way this memory 
functions. This also reveals east German attempts to make their past and present 
compatible as they select ideals and rituals for preservation in an attempt to create 
continuity, identity, and to refashion the present so that it can accept these. Cast in the 
GDR and reborn in the globalized Berlin Republic, the happy, hat-wearing Ampelmann is 







A green Ampelmann light. Photo by author. 
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A diagram comparing different traffic symbols, proclaiming Ampelmann’s superiority 





Ampelmann helps a young girl cross a Tokyo street.
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A postcard, much like the poster mentioned in chapter 4, depicting Ampelmann alongside 
his worldwide colleagues.
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A postcard sold in Ampelmann stores. Collection of the author.
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